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ABSTRACT 
The face of conflict is changing. The breakup of the former Soviet Union has 
changed the balance of power from a bi-polar to a uni-polar one. This change in the 
world's power structure has presented the United States with new challenges. The 
purpose of this thesis is to explore one of these challenges, state-sponsored terrorism, and 
the range of military responses that might be used to deter states from sponsoring 
terrorism or coercing states into ceasing their sponsorship. This thesis uses conventional 
deterrence and coercion theory, as well as comparative case studies to analyze the utility 
of deterrence and coercion against state-sponsored terrorism. In doing so a framework 
that can be applied to state sponsors of terrorism was developed to determine if a strategy 
of deterrence or coercion could alter a state's behavior. The findings of this thesis 
suggest that ~ determined coercive strategy is more likely to work against state-sponsored 
terrorism than a strat.egy of deterrence. Finally, the thesis provides a model, a taxonomy 
of coercion that recommends using lethal and non-lethal options in overt and covert 
operations as the means to modify the behavior of states that sponsor terrorism. 
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The face of conflict is changing. The breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the 
end of the Cold War, have changed the world from a bi-polar to a uni-polar structure. 
Regional conflicts, which were held in check by the superpowers, are now potential 
flashpoints, ready to explode at any time. This change in the world's power structure has 
altered the political and economic landscape and presented the United States with new 
challenges and vulnerabilities. U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen addressed 
these vulnerabilities, stating: " ... while the prospect of a horrific, global war has receded, 
new threats and dangers - harder to define and more difficult to track - have gathered on 
the horizon" (1997, p.1). 
One of the primar)' concerns facing our country is the threat of terrorist attacks. 
According to Frank Ciluffo, U.S. terrorist experts have been worried for decades about 
the possibility of two types of attacks: the likelihood of a major terrorist strike within the 
U.S. and the possible use.of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists (1996, 
p.1 ). The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center has taken us across the first 
threshold, and there is evidence that we may be crossing the second threshold some time 
in the near future as the military asymmetry between the U.S. and the remainder of the 
world continues to increase. 
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1. State-Sponsored Terrorism as an Asymmetric Threat 
Regional, state, and substate actors will pursue their goals, which sometimes 
conflict with U.S. goals and objectives. Many of these competitors are learning to avoid 
our strengths and to exploit our weaknesses. The smart competitors will challenge the 
U.S. asymmetrically, by avoiding direct military confrontation, since direct confrontation 
puts these competitors at an automatic disadvantage. I 
One of the most popular and effective asymmetric strategies used by these weaker 
competitors is state-sponsored terrorism, where a state provides a terrorist group with 
either logistical support, operational support, or direct involvement in the terrorist act. 
State-sponsored_ terrorism has existed in one form or another throughout history. 
However, the popularity of modem terrorism, i.e., "politically motivated violence 
intended to influence an audience" (Tucker, 1997, p. 53) seems to have flourished in the 
201h century. It did not take long for governments to recognize the utility of sponsoring or 
sanctioning terrorist attacks, and they were soon using state-sponsored terrorism to pursue 
their political objectives. 
Prior to 1970, most terrorist organizations were autonomous and carried out their 
own acts of terror without the help of an outside supporter. However, during the 1970s a 
small number of governments, namely the former Soviet Union, began to employ states 
I For additional information regarding asymmetry and the strategy of the U.S. as well as 
the countries using it against the U.S. see, Bennett, et al., What Are Asymmetric 
Strategies? (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1998) and Matthews (Ed.), Challenging the 
United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America be Defeated? (Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998). 
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such as Libya, Iraq, and Syria as conduits, for many terrorist groups for reasons such as 
kidnappings, espionage, and small-scale attacks in an effort to influence other 
governments. The Soviets provided weapons, training, intelligence, and logistical 
support for these groups. A number of Arab states soon followed by using this model of 
terrorism as a tool to repress internal opposition and uprisings and soon after began to use 
this brand of terrorism as a weapon against other countries ("State-Sponsored Terrorism: 
Statement of the Problem", 1997). 
2. U.S. Counterterrorist (CT) Policy 
Early U.S. counterterrorist (CT) policy, which consisted of such formulations as 
"no concessions" and international conventions, did not make state~ "pay" for supporting 
terrorism. In an effort to adjust the cost-to-benefit ratios of the state sponsors of 
terrorism, the Carter administration changed the CT strategy when it began· targeting 
sponsors with economic sanctions, as well as with the use of military force through the 
creation of a hostage rescue capability (Tucker, p. 16). 
The 1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism lists the current U.S. CT strategy as: 
"first, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; second, bring terrorists to 
justice for their crimes; third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism 
to force them to change their behavior; and fourth, bolster counterterrorism capabilities of 
those countries that work with the United States and require assistance" (1999, p. 1). 
In an effort to influence and change the behavior of state-sponsors of terrorism, 
the U.S. is committed to a long-term fight. We are willing to use all available means to 
3 
target terrorism, including diplomacy backed by the use of force when necessary, as well 
as law enforcement and economic measures (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, p. 1). 
In a 1999 press briefing, Michael Sheehan, the acting Coordinator for the Office of 
Counterterrorism, identified what the U.S. required of a state-sponsor before they were 
removed from the State Department's list of state-sponsors. He explains that these states, 
must "stop planning, stop financing, stop supporting acts, stop providing safe haven and 
shelter for those who are involved in terrorist activities" (Sheehan, 1999, p. 1). The two 
primary tools, which the U.S. still relies upon to combat state-sponsored terrorism, are 
economic sanctions and military force. 2 
a) Sanctions as a Weapon Against State-Sponsored Terrorism 
Since they were added as options in the 1970s, economic sanctions, " ... 
the deliberate curtailment or cessation by a government of customary economic or 
financial relations in order to coerce a government" (Tucker, p. 85), have been the 
weapon of choice against state-sponsored terrorism, as well as the most frequently used 
means to carry out U.S. foreign policy. Since 1973, the U.S. government has imposed 
sanctions on eight countries which have been listed as state sponsors of terrorism, they 
are: Cuba (1982, 1986), Iran (1980, 1984), Iraq (1979; lifted 1982; reimposed 1990), 
2 See also Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 
Publishers, 1997), pp. 71-107. In this chapter he describes the nine different measures 
that the U.S. has used to counter terrorism: international legal conventions, defensive 
measures, addressing the causes of terrorism, a policy of no concessions, economic 
sanctions, military retaliation, prosecution, preemption, and disruption. 
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Libya (1973, 1979, 1985; with the UN, 1992, 1993), North Korea (1988), Syria (1979, 
1986), Sudan (1993) and South Yemen (1979; lifted in 1990 when South Yemen became 
part of the Yemen Arab Republic) (Tucker, p. 88). In an effort to modify the behavior of 
these state-sponsors of terrorism, "U.S. policy is to pressure these states to cease their 
support by applying a broad range of sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral" (Patterns 
of Global Terrorism, 1999, p. 30). 
There are a number of arguments for and against the utility of using 
economic sanctions against state-sponsored terrorism. The people that support the use of 
sanctions argue that they are symbolic in nature and signal the seriousness of our effort to 
combat terrorism while diminishing the ability of states to support terrorism. These 
people also argue that the cost of sanctions are much less than the cost of war, with regard 
to lives lost, money spent, and damaged international relations (Tucker, p. 89). 
One of the strongest arguments against sanctions is that the U.S. has a 
difficult time getting other countries to support our efforts; so we typically go it alone 
with unilateral sanctions. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney argues that 
unilateral economic sanctions almost never work and that it is difficult to find examples 
where they have attained a policy objective. "In the last 80 years, the United States has 
imposed economic sanctions some 120 times. More than half of those 120 instances have 
occurred in the last five years ... " (1999, p. 23). Of these 120 instances, fourteen 
unilateral and two multilateral sanctions have been imposed on state sponsors of 
terrorism since 1973, with little effect. Tucker explains that since 1973 there have been 
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only two instances where sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism have been lifted, 
Iraq in 1982; but reimposed in 1990, and South Yemen in 1990 when it became part of 
the Yemen Arab Republic (Tucker, p. 88).3 
Another argument against the use of sanctions is that they often harm the 
average citizens and the most poor, and ofttimes do not break through the shield around 
the people whose behavior the sanctions are intended to modify. Even if sanctions are 
successful, we have to take into consideration that they are a blunt force instrument that 
cause a great deal of collateral damage. In certain situations the people the sanctions are 
targeted at may be able to use collateral damage caused by sanctions as a means to rally 
the _support of their people against the country levying the sanctions. 
While it is quite evident· thi;tt a number of sponsors have curtailed their 
efforts, sanctions have.proved to be singularly unsuccessful in pressuring any of the state-
sponsors of terrorism identified by the US State Department of State to renounce their 
behavior. For this reason one must ask how long are we willing to rely upon unilateral 
sanctions alone in an effort to change a countries behavior? We have imposed sanctions 
in one form or another for approximately 30 years on Libya (Tucker, p. 16) and nearly 40 
years on Cuba (Howell, 1995, p. 37), for reasons that go beyond their links to terrorism, 
without significantly changing their behavior. For this reason, the use of unilateral 
3 For further information on the utility of sanctions see Howell, "Economic Sanctions as 
Weapons", USA Today Magazine (July 1995), p. 37; as well as Yeutter. "Unilateral 
Sanctions: A Politically Attractive Loser", in Singleton, Solveig and Griswold, Daniel T., 
(Eds.), Economic Casualties (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 1999). 
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sanctions may have to be re-evaluated as a tool in the battle against state-sponsors of 
terrorism. We do not have enough time to let sanctions alone run their course in the 
battle against state-sponsored terrorism. The lethality of state-sponsored terrorist attacks 
is increasing, along with the possibility that state sponsors may acquire weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). In an effort to increase the pressure on these states, I propose that 
we incorporate the use of military force along with sanctions as part of our 
counterterrorist strategy. 
b) Military Retaliation 
While often threatened, military retaliation is used far less often than 
economic sanctions as a tool to battle state-sponsored terrorism. A 1999 CNN report 
states that military reprisals against state-sponsored terrorism have only been used three 
times by the U.S. government: the 1986 bombings of Libya, the 1993 cruise missile strike 
on Iraq, and the 1998 attack on suspected terrorist sites in Sudan and Afghanistan ("CIA 
Tries New Strategy to Deter Terrorism", 1999, p. 2). 
To date U._S. military reprisals against state-sponsored terrorism have 
consisted of limited military operations where "one shot" strikes have been used against 
the sponsoring states. Although these limited operations have had some effect on 
modifying some states' support of terrorism, overall they are not a "tough test" of 
forceful policy and have had little to do with long term results, much like economic 
sanctions. The most significant case of U.S. military reprisals to date against a state 
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sponsor is the 1986 bombing of Libya, which caused the Libyans to modify their level 
and type of support, but did not wholly stop their support of terrorism. 
Despite the limited success of our military responses to state-sponsored 
terrorism to date, the use of the military as a tool to battle terrorism merits further study. 
However, in order for the military to be successful in this battle, we will have to re-
evaluate the threat and how the military is used to combat it. This use, or threatened use, 
of the military as a tool in the battle against state-sponsored terrorism is the focus of this 
thesis. But in order to conduct this study, we will also have to look to other countries that 
have used military force on a more protracted basis against state-sponsored terrorism. 
One of the best examples available is provided by the Israelis in their protracted battle 
against terrorism since the creation of the Israeli State. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to re-examine how the U.S. deals with the 
asymmetric threat of state-sponsored terrorism. In doing so, I will focus on military 
responses to state-sponsored terrorism; and analyze how states might be deterred from 
sponsoring terrorism, or coerced into ceasing their sponsorship by either conventional or 
unconventional means. This thesis will attempt to develop a framework that can be 
applied to a state sponsor of terrorism in a given situation, to determine whether a 
strategy of det~rrence or coercion can alter that state's behavior. 
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C. RELEVANCE 
Today's version of state-sponsored terrorism is relatively new. Its roots can be 
traced back to the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the Soviets and a number of Middle 
Eastern countries began supporting terrorist groups (Tucker, p. 16). The sponsors and the 
terrorist groups themselves have been innovative in their tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) in an attempt to stay one step ahead of their adversaries. The primary 
areas where the sponsors and groups have innovated is in the increased lethality of the 
terrorist acts themselves, as well as the increased possibility of proliferation and or use of 
WMD in a state-sponsored terrorist act. 
1. Increased Lethality of State-Sponsored Terrorist ~ncidents 
There has been a noticeable decline in the number of international terrorist 
incidents, as depicted in Figure 1-1, as well as state-sponsored terrorist incidents in recent 
years (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, pp. 1, 30).4 The 1998 issue of Patterns of 
Global Terrorism attributes this to the "diplomatic and law enforcement progress we 
have made in discrediting terrorist groups and making it harder for them to operate. It 
also reflects the improved political climate that has diminished terrorist activity in recent 
years in various parts of the world" (1999, p. 1). 
Although the 1990s have seen a continued downward trend in the number of 
international terrorist attacks, the level of violence has actually risen. For example, there 
4 It should be noted that Figure 1-1 lists international terrorist incidents overall, and does 
not separate out state-sponsored terrorist incidents. 
9 
were 273 international terrorist attacks during 1998, as compared to 304 attacks during 
1997. The 1998 total marks the lowest number of terrorist attacks since 1971; but 
actually registers the highest number of people killed (741) and wounded (5,592) ever 
recorded. A majority of these record numbers for 1998 can be attributed to the two 






198 7 1988 1989 
ti Attacks 666 605 375 
•Fatalities 633 658 390 
D Injuries 227 2 1131 397 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
437 565 363 431 322 440 
200 102 93 109 314 165 
677 242 636 1393 663 6291 
I ml Attacks •Fatalities D Injuries j 
Figure 1-1, International Terrorist Incidents, 1987-1998 









Figure 1-1 breaks down international terrorist attacks from 1987-1998 by year, 






table clearly depicts that there is a decrease in the number of attacks, while the number of 
fatalities and injuries have been increasing. 
While the number of incidents of state-sponsored terrorism has been declining, 
Bruce Hoffman explains that this kind of terror has always had a high level of lethality 
when compared to other acts of terrorism. He writes, "... identifiable state-sponsored 
terrorist attacks during the 1980s were overall eight times more lethal than those carried 
out by groups without state support or assistance". He goes on to explain that the reason 
for this increase in the level of violence is that state sponsors of terrorism operate under 
fewer constraints. They have fewer constraints because they are geared less towards 
gai!ling publicity and more toward pursuing their foreign policy objectives. Also, they do 
not rely on the local populace for support (~offman, 1998, p. 189). 
As long as the. gun and the bomb continue to bring about the desired results for 
the state-sponsored terrorist, there should be only incremental rather than sharp increases 
in the lethality of these terrorist acts. However, Hoffman warns that if the defensive 
measures of states continue to improve, to the point that they make the "conventional" 
weapons of the terrorists obsolete, then state sponsors of terrorism may be impelled to 
increase their level of violence. He goes on to say, "if, however, terrorist lethality 
continues to increase and the constraints, self-imposed and otherwise imposed on 
terrorists in the commission of mass murder erode further, actions involving chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons could become more attractive to some terrorist groups" 
(Hoffman, 1992, p.16). 
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2. Possible Proliferation and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) 
Another area, which goes hand in hand with the increased lethality of state-
sponsored terrorism, is the possible proliferation and use of WMD in a state-sponsored 
terrorist incident. While there has been no recorded use of a WMD device (a nuclear, 
biological, chemical, or radiological device) in a state-sponsored terrorist incident, there 
are a number of people who believe that the answer to the question is not whether this 
paradigm 'will be broken, but when. According to Walter Laqueur, "Proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction does not mean that most terrorists are likely to use them in 
the foreseeable future, but some almost certainly will, in spite of the reasons militating 
against it" (1996a, p. 34). 
There_ are two primary reasons why people are worried about the proliferation and 
possible use of W11D. First, is the reported accessibility to nuclear weapons and 
materials in a number of countries that were once part of the Soviet Union; and second is 
the fact that a number of countries who are considered to be state sponsors of terrorism 
are already producing their own chemical and biological weapons.5 
5 For additional information on these concerns about the proliferation ofWMD to 
terrorist organizations see, Hoffman, 1992; Hoffman, 1998; Hoffman and Claridge, Illicit 
Trafficking in Nuclear Materials (Warwickshire: Research Institute for the Study of 
Conflict and Terrorism, 1999); Hoffman, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
An Analysis of Trends and Motivations (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1999); Cilhiffo and 
Kupperman, "Between War and Peace: Deterrence and Leverage'', The Brown Journal of 
World Affairs (Winter/Spring 1997); Laqueur, "Terrorism: Looking to the Future", 
Current (October 1996), no 386, p. 9; Medd and Goldstein, "International Terrorism on 
the Eve of a New Millennium'', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (1997), v 20, no 3, p. 
281; Lieutenant General Hughes, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. "Global Threats 
12 
a) Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Materials 
A number of government analysts have been concerned that rogue states 
or terrorist groups may someday acquire nuclear weapons or radiological materials to be 
used in a terrorist attack. Stefan Leader explains that there have been two fairly recent 
developments that have increased the concern over such an attack: "the large but 
uncertain quantities of poorly secured weapons-usable and other nuclear materials in the 
former Soviet Union, and the 1995 incic;lent in which Chechen terrorists planted a 
radioactive substance designed to create fear of contamination and radiation sickness in a 
Moscow park" (Leader, 1997).6 
b) 'Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Although chemical and biological weapons have never been used in a 
state-sponsored terrorist incident, the Aum Shinrikyo Cult used chemical weapons in 
another terrorist incident. This attack breached a threshold where a number of terrorist 
experts believed that the first successful use of chemical or biological weapons by 
and Challenges: The Decades Ahead", Prepared Statement before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee (February 2, 1999); Commander Campbell, "Testimony Before the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information 
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Threats to America: Are We Prepared?" (April 22, 1998); and Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go 
Nuclear? (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1975). 
6 For additional information and references pertaining to this incident, involving the 
Chechen terrorists' use of radiological material see, Hoffinan and Claridge, 1999, pp. 28-
29. 
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terrorists would lower the level of restraint on their use by other groups and also increase 
the risk of their subsequent use. 
Another factor which may encourage the use of these weapons is that the 
raw materials for chemical and biological weapons can be purchased on the open, gray, or 
black markets (Leader, 1997). In some instances the state sponsors can take care of the 
. procurement problem themselves. A number of countries, such as, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Libya, and North Korea, are thought to have active chemical and biological weapons. It 
would be very easy for one of these states to provide a terrorist group with one of these 
weapons. 
Although the use of WMD devices in a state-sponsored terrorist incident 
appears to growing nearer, I feel that their initial use is still some time away. _The risk of 
detection, the possibility of losing control of the terrorist group, as well as the fear of 
retaliation are a few of the reasons why state-sponsors have not provided any groups with 
a WMD device. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This analysis is guided by the hypothesis that, by focusing on military responses 
to state-sponsored terrorism, we can modify the behavior of these sponsors. It is 
important to analyze this hypothesis because of the increasing asymmetry between the 
U.S. and the remainder of the world, which suggests terrorist incidents will increase in 
number and lethality in the coming years, and because we have had such little success in 
convincing these states to stop sponsoring terrorism. 
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The first part of this study (Chapter II) lays the foundation for understanding 
state-sponsored terrorism. It does this by defining what state-sponsored terrorism is, who 
these sponsors are, and the different degrees of sponsorship a state may provide. 
Chapter III provides a description of the behavior of regional foes, who happen to 
be the primary state-sponsors of terrorism. It is important to understand these 
characteristics, because the leaders of these countries often times go about making 
decisions in a manner foreign to the Western mind. 
Chapter IV will serve as a means to provide the reader with a framework and 
description of the theory of conventional deterrence and coercion. In the process of 
describing these theories, I will point out areas where the theories are likely to be 
deficient or counterproductive in fighting state-sponsored t~rrorism. 
Chapter V provides historical case materials where deterrence and coercion were 
used in various efforts to combat state-sponsored terrorism. The three cases that I have 
selected represent a sample of the historical instances where these strategies were 
attempted. The three cases are: Operation El Dorado Canyon, where the U.S. retaliated 
militarily against Libyan state~sponsored terrorism; the continuing Israeli struggles and 
use of military reprisals against state-sponsored terrorism; and finally, Operation Infinite 
Reach, the U.S. cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan for their reported 
support of Osama Bin Laden and his organization, following the terrorist attacks against 
two U.S. embassies in Africa. 
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Any study dealing with state-sponsored terrorism, and possible responses to it, 
would be incomplete without some mention of Operation El Dorado Canyon. For the 
purpose of this study there were two primary reasons why I chose this case. First, 
Operation El Dorado Canyon is an example of the use of coercion and deterrence against 
a state-sponsor of terrorism, as well as against terrorism in general. Tim Zimmerman 
writes that this operation was, " ... the first formal step in a comprehensive and intensive 
strategy of coercive diplomacy. The stated aim of that policy was to persuade Qaddafi-
through the use of diplomatic, economic, and military means-to end his sponsorship of 
terrorism" (1994, p. 201). Prunckun and Mohr, on the other hand, view this operation as 
a deterrent strategy against future Libyan terrorist attacks as well as a warning signal to 
other state-sponsors of terrorism, as well as terrorist groups, that they could expect the 
same punishment for their involvement. Up until this attack on Libya, deterrence theory 
had almost been exclusively used in conventional force on force military matters alone 
(1996, pp. 269-270). Second, this is one of the best-studied and documented cases of a 
military response to state-sponsored terrorism. 
In an effort to contrast the U.S. responses to state-sponsored terrorism, I chose to 
present the Israeli case as a history of protracted struggle against terrorism. They have 
always thought of the protection of their country as paramount, and they have always 
been uncompromising in their responses to terrorism. For the purpose of this study there 
were three primary reasons why I chose Israel as a case study. First, Israel is one of the 
most popular targets of state-sponsored terrorism, and there is extensive case material 
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dating from the creation of the state of Israel. Second, Israeli efforts against state-
sponsored terrorism are a life and death matter, and not a strategic choice that a country 
such as the U.S. has the luxury to make. And finally, Crenshaw and Pimlott write, "the 
Israeli response to terrorism has been founded on the principles of deterrence, 
preemption, prevention, and reprisals" (1997, p. 615). 
The final case, Operation Infinite Reach, presents a situation where two states, 
Afghanistan and Sudan, were reportedly providing support to bin Ladin's terrorist 
network. It also presents what could be a new terrorist paradigm where individuals such 
as Osama bin Ladin may be replacing or at least competing with state-sponsors of 
terr~rism. According to Yael Shahar, " Bin Ladin is the prototype of a new breed of 
terrorist, the private entrepreneur who puts modem enterprise at the service of a world-
wide network of terrorists. He makes effective use of all the tried and true methods of 
marketing, management, privatization and advertising" (1998, p. 1 ). Because he is an 
individual, and not a state, Osama bin Laden is less vulnerable than a government to the 
traditional international pressures such as economic sanctions. This means that we will 
have to come up with unique approaches to deal with this new threat. 
Finally, in Chapter VI, I will attempt to combine the insights from chapters III and 
IV with the findings of the case studies in Chapter V, in an attempt to develop a 
framework with which to target state sponsors of terrorism. 
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II. STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 
The terrorist threat to the US. will likely grow as disgruntled groups and 
individuals focus on America as the most prominent symbol of what is wrong in the 
world While state-sponsorship of terrorism may decline, Iran and some other nations, 
and private individuals will continue to support wide-ranging terrorist and subversive 
activities. The potential for terrorists to use WMD will increase over time, with 
chemical, biological, and radiological agents the most likely choice. 
Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence 
Agency (February 2, 1999)7 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the past, terrorism, "politically motivated violence intended to influence an 
audience" (Tucker, p. 53) was generally practiced by a group of individuals who 
belonged to an identifiable and autonomous organization, which had identifiable 
objectives. They generally took credit for their attacks and often times explained their 
motivations and aims in an effort to gain recognition for their cause. However, when 
states began to use these terrorist groups as the covert proxies of the cold war, another 
type of terrorism, which became know as state-sponsored terrorism, came into being. 
This new type of terrorism .had the objectives and aims of the sponsoring state as the 
primary goal and was not overly concerned about the cause of the terrorist organization. 
According to Sean Anderson, a noted contributor to terrorist theory, state-
sponsored terrorism can be defined as "active involvement by foreign governments in 
training, arming, and providing other logistical and intelligence assistance as well as 
7 The passage was part of a prepared statement L TG Hughes presented before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee as cited in Hughes, 1999, pp. 4-5. 
19 
sanctuary to terrorists for the purpose of carrying out violent acts on behalf of that 
government against its enemies" (Anderson, 1998, p. 283). 
One of the most appealing aspects of state-sponsored terrorism is that it provides 
states the ability to achieve strategic goals in instances where the use of conventional 
armed forces would be deemed inappropriate, ineffective, too risky, or too difficult. The 
high costs of modem warfare, the Cold War, and concern about nuclear escalation, as 
well as the danger of defeat and the unwillingness to appear as the aggressor, have turned 
terrorism into an efficient, convenient, and generally discrete weapon for attaining state 
interests in the international realm (Ganor, 1998, p. 2). 
According to Bruce Hoffman, the Iranian hostage crisis was the defining moment 
where state-sponsored terrorism emerged as an instrument of foreign policy and weapon 
of the state. This crisis demonstrated that state-sponsored terrorism could be a relatively 
inexpensive and, if executed properly, potentially risk-free means of anonymously 
attacking stronger enemies and, by means of hiding behind a veil of terror, to avoid the 
threat of international punishment or reprisal (Hoffman, 1998, p. 186). 
State-sponsored terrorism has had a broad impact on the worldwide patterns of 
terrorism. State-sponsored terrorist groups operate under fewer constraints than ordinary 
terrorist groups, because the sponsored groups are geared more to pursuing specific 
foreign policy objectives rather than concerning themselves with obtaining publicity. In 
addition, because state sponsors of terrorism are not reliant upon the local populace for 
support, they do not have to concern themselves with the possibility of alienating popular 
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local support or provoking possible public retaliation. Thus, the sponsor and the terrorist 
group can engage in acts of violence that are typically more destructive and bloodier than 
those carried out by groups acting on their own behalf. 8 
B. THE STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM 
In an effort to curb the number of supporters of state-sponsored terrorism, as well 
as the quality of support available to the terrorist groups, the U.S. State Department 
releases a yearly list of the countries tliey deem to be state sponsors of terrorism. The 
State Department primarily relies upon bilateral as well as multilateral sanctions in an 
attempt to discourage these countries from continuing their support of state sponsored 
terrorism. 
The 1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism lists the same seven countries as state-
sponsors of terrorism as it did in the 1997 publication, while also certifying that an 
eighth, Afghanistan, is not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts (1999, 
p.1 ). Michael Sheehan explains that Afghanistan fits the criteria to become a member of 
the list, but was not added because the U.S. does not re_cognize it as a state, and because 
8 This idea is contrary to the accepted belief that terrorist groups are generally concerned 
with publicity and are selective and discriminate in their acts of violence because of their 
concerns not to alienate their constituency or trigger government reprisals. This line of 
thinking is supported by a famous quote of Brian Jenkins: "Terrorists want a lot of 
people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead". See Jenkins, 
"International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict" in Carlton and Schaerf, (Eds.), 
International Terrorism and World Security (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 15. 
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they do not have a seat in the UN (Sheehan, 1999, p. 3). The seven countries named as 
state-sponsors of terrorism, by the 1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism are: 
1. Cuba 
Cuba is no longer considered as an active state sponsor of terrorism. Since the fall 
of the former Soviet Union, the Castro regime has been forced to reduce the monetary 
support to leftist revolutionaries significantly. While Cuba's active support has declined 
noticeably, passive support, namely providing a safe haven to international terrorists and 
U.S. terrorist fugitives, has kept Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. 
2. Iran 
Iran still plans and conducts terrorist attacks, including the assassination of 
dissidents abroad. It provides support to a number of groups that use terrorism to pursue 
their goals, including several that oppose the Middle East peace process. They provide 
this support by giving the terrorist groups money, training, safe haven, and weapons. 
3. Iraq 
Iraq continues to provide safe haven to terrorist and rejectionist groups while also 
working toward rebuilding its intelligence network, which it used earlier in the decade to 
support international terrorism. 
4. Libya 
While Libya recently turned over the two intelligence operatives, who were 
charged in the U.S. and Scotland for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, they still 
are harboring six suspects, wanted by the French, in the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight 
772. Libya has also been linked to supporting several Middle Eastern terrorist groups, to 
22 
varying degrees, but there is no evidence that Libya has been involved in recent acts of 
international terrorism. 
5. North Korea 
North Korea has not been linked to any acts of international terrorism since 1987. 
They do however, continue to harbor and provide safe haven to a small number of 
terrorists who hijacked a Japanese airliner to North Korea in 1970. 
6. Sudan 
Sudan has been linked to providing safe haven to some of the world's most 
violent terrorist groups, to include Osama Bin Ladin's al-Qaida and the Lebanese 
Hizballah group. The Sudanese government also continues to resist the demands of the 
UN Security Council that they hand over three fugitives linked to the assassination 
attempt against Egyptian President Mubarak. 
7. Syria· 
While Syria cannot be linked to any direct acts of international terrorism since 
1986, they continue to provide sanctuary and support to a number of terrorist groups that 
wish to damage the Middle East peace process. 
Only Sudan, which was added to the list in 1993, and Afghanistan, which the U.S. 
Government certified as not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts in 1998, 
have the distinction of being on the list for less than a decade. The primary reasons that 
the other countries have been on the list so long are that the economic sanctions and 
military reprisals we have used have not been very effective in sufficiently modifying 
23 
their behavior and stopping their support of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998, p. 191 and 
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, pp. iii, 30-34). 
C. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM 
Each of the seven states identified by the State Department's criteria sponsors 
terror; but they are not all sponsoring terrorism to the same degree. This is a very 
important distinction to remember when considering possible responses to terrorist 
incidents. Not all degrees of state-sponsorship pose the same threat, and they merit 
separate consideration if some level of retaliation or punishment is to be delivered. It 
would not be fair to punish all state-sponsors the same when some states are providing 
nothing more than a safe haven while others are actively taking part in the terrorist 
attacks. 
The level of state involvement in terrorism varies, from providing logistical 
support and operational assistance, initiating or directing attacks, to the actual conduct of 
terrorist attacks by official state agencies. In general, all state involvement in terrorism 
falls under the heading of state-sponsored terrorism. Ganor provides a classification of 
states according to their level of involvement in terrorism: 
1. States Supporting Terrorism (Logistical Support) 
States that fall under this heading are ones that support terrorist organizations by 
providing ideological support, financial support, military support, as well as operational 
support. 
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The most basic form of this type of support is ideological. The most prolific 
suppliers of this type of support were the former Soviet Union and Iran, because they had 
a strategic goal of spreading their revolutionary ideology, which was communism in the 
case of the former Soviet Union and Islamic fundamentalism in the case oflran. 
The next level of state support is financial. Terrorist organizations require large 
sums of money to plan and carry out their attacks. They are oft-times unable to generate 
these large sums of money, so they must rely upon the support of a sponsoring state. The 
Iranians, who provide approximately $100 million a year to terrorist activities, are far and 
above the largest financial contributors to state-sponsored terrorism. 
The next higher level of support is military. States that provide this type of 
support supply the terrorist groups with weapons, military training, and in~truction to 
activists. 
The highest level of support in this category is operational. States that are 
involved in this type of support provide direct state assistance to the perpetrators of the 
terrorist incident. This type of support includes: safe havens, false documents, special 
weapons, etc. 
2. States Operating Terrorism (Operational Support) 
States that fall under this category are the initiators, directors, and performers of 
terrorist acts through individuals or groups that are not part of their organization. States 
that fall in this category go beyond providing support directly to the terrorist 
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organizations. These states give specific instructions to the terrorist groups as to what the 
target will be, when it will be attacked, and how the operation will be done. 
3. States Perpetrating Terrorism (Direct Action) 
The highest level of state involvement in terrorist activities is direct involvement 
in terrorist attacks. States that fall under this category commit terrorist acts worldwide 
through their own official organizations such as security forces, intelligence members, or 
agents working for the state. These attacks often times are directed against civilians in 
another country in an attempt to pursue political aims, without declaring a state of war, 
with little or no fear of reprisals (Ganer, 1997, pp. 4-7, and 1998, p. 12). For the 
purposes of this study, I am not concerned about state terror within the borders of the 
sponsoring state. Instead, I examine state-sponsored terrorist attacks taking place outside 
of the borders of the sponsoring state. 
In Figure 2-1, I have attempted to categorize the seven state sponsors of 
terrorism according to the type of support they provide to terrorist groups. In the figure, 
Iran is the only country that actively sponsors terrorism at all three levels, with Iraq and 
Libya the next most active. Even though Iranian sponsorship has not been significantly 
reduced, the U.S. State Department has dropped its designation of Iran as the world's 
leading sponsor of terrorism, in an effort to ease relations between the two states. This is 
a significant change from the 1997 designation that placed Iran as "the most active state 
sponsor of terrorism", and the 1996 designation that placed Iran as the "premier" terrorist 
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state ("State Department Hopes Report Will Ease Hostile Relations", May 1, 1999, p. 
1 lA). 
State 0 erational Su ort Direct Action 
Cuba No No 
Iran Yes Yes Yes 
Iraq Yes Yes No 
Libya Yes Yes No 
North Korea Yes No No 
Sudan Yes No No 
Syria Yes No No 
Figure 2-1, Degree of State-Support to Terrorism 
Source: Pallerns of'Glohal Terrorism. 1999. pp. 28-34 and Ganor. 1997. pp. 4-7 
D. SUMMARY 
Now that we are aware of the various features of state-sponsored terrorism, we 
can confront the problem of how to deter states from sponsoring terrorist groups or to 
coerce them into ceasing their support for terrorist groups. It is important that the 
sponsors be categorized according to their level of support in an attempt to arrive at an 
equitable and well defined strategy with which to combat the states that support 
terrorism. It may not be fair or practical to treat a country that is simply providing a safe 
haven the same as a country that provides operational support, or even worse, takes direct 
action in the terrorist acts. 
But before we can begin to think about combating state-sponsored terrorism, we 
must put some thought into what types of states are providing support to the terrorist 
organizations. Some of the areas that will be discussed in the next chapter include: how 
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these states make decisions; how they deal with the idea of losing something; what type 
of regime rules the country; and how the regimes cope with domestic political instability. 
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III. ADVERSARY BEHAVIOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The threat or use of force affects states, regimes, leaders, and individuals in many 
different ways. Some may react just as expected, while others do something totally 
unexpected. In an effort to better understand the range of responses, I will attempt to 
identify and discuss the primary factors that affect the behavior of various types of 
adversaries. In order to do this I will first show how states are thought to make decisions, 
by discussing rational choice theory. Second, I will discuss how the psychology of gain 
and loss affect decisions by discussing prospect theory. And finally, I will discuss the 
character and motivation of potential adversaries, which are influenced by what type of 
regime controls the state, as well as the level of domestic instability within the state. 
B. RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
The first factor that I want to discuss is decision making. In an effort to 
understand the decision making process, I am going to primarily rely upon rational choice 
theory. According to Linda George the genesis for rational choice theory can be traced 
back to one of the most basic assumptions of society that says "people are, or strive to be 
rational, especially in making decisions". Eventually this assumption, as well as others, 
is gathered into theories to be used generally. The theories based on this assumption of 
rationality are most often referred to today as rational choice theory (1998, p. 32). 
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At the most basic level, rational choice theory relies upon the idea that people 
want to maximize their benefits or utility, and will act in a way to make this happen. In 
order to maximize utility, people have many possible choices to choose from. Some of 
the choices will bring positive results while others will not. In an effort to get the 
maximum results out of their choices, people will use rational choice to examine the 
available choices and select the ones that have the most potential for their desires. 
Accordin~ to George there ar~ three elements that are used to compute the net benefits for 
each option selected. First, is the real utility or value to be realized from the outcome of 
the choice. Second, are the costs, explicit and implicit, that accompany the choice. And 
finally, are the gains that could have been realized if an alternative choice had been made. 
For these reasons rational choice theory assumes that people intended to make the 
choices, they were conscious of their choices, and they were rational when they made 
their choices (1998, p. 33). 
In a 1995 sfudy, Watman, Wilkening, Arquilla, and Nichiporuk explore how 
deterrence affects the decision-making processes of regional powers. In their explanation 
they explain that the process of rational choice theory consists of building a mental model 
of the future by laying out decisions in terms of choices, predicting the expected 
outcomes of each choice, and selecting the one that will provide an outcome closest to the 
one that is desired (Watman et al., 1995, p. 18).9 
9 For additional information on rational choice theory and how it applies to deterrence 
and coercion, some of the available works include the following: George and Smoke, 
1974; George and Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy'', World Politics (January 1, 
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In the case of deterrence, the authors use a scenario where a regional foe is 
contemplating an attack against a defender. In Figure 3-1 we see a depiction of some of 
the possible choices that the attacker must contemplate. The depiction, a decision tree, 
shows that the attacker has two choices, whether to attack or not attack. If the decision is 
made to attack the attacker is faced with two possible consequences that rely upon the 
actions of the defender after being attacked. First, the defender can respond to the attack 
(Ul), and second the defender can choose not to respond (U2) (Watman et al., pp. 18-19). 
Prior to attacking, the attacker whether knowingly or not, does a cost-to-benefits 
analysis in an attempt to decide if the expected utility of the attack is higher than the cost 
of a retaliatory strike from the defender, which is depicted by Ul. The likelihood that the 
defender will conduct a retaliatory strike against the attacker is signified by p, while the 
likelihood that the defender is bluffing and will not retaliate is signified by 1-p. Once the 
attacker has taken p and 1-p into consideration, he must next consider what can be gained 
by carrying out an attack without drawing a response from the defender, which is 
represented by U2. The attacker calculates the value of conducting an attack, whether 
1989), v 41, no 2; Zagare, "Rationality and Deterrence", World Politics (January 1990), v 
42, no 2; and Morgan, Deterrence (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977). See also for 
additional information on rational choice theory, Simon, Economics, Bounded Rationality 
and the Cognitive Revolution (Brookfield, Vermont: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 
1992); Tversky and Kahneman, "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions", in Bell, 
Raiffa, and Tv~rsky (Eds.), Decision Making (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial Works and Punishment 
Doesn't'', The Journal of Strategic Studies (December 1992), v 15, no 4, pp. 423-475; 
and Walt, "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies'', International 
Security (Spring 1999), v 23, no 4, pp. 5-48. 
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knowingly or not, by comparing the two possible outcomes (Ul and U2) weighted by the 
likelihood that each will occur (p and 1-p) (Watman et al., pp. 18-19). 
Once the attacker has considered the two possibilities related to attacking, it also 
has to compare the value of attacking (Ul or U2) to the value of not attacking and 
accepting the status quo, which is signified by U3. The primary thing that the decision 
maker must consider when calculating U3, is that the status guo includes present and 
future situations, whether good or bad. To the Western mind, the attacker is taking a 
calculated gamble because he cannot see into the future. However, if the attacker 
believes that the only hope for improving the conditions of his country are by attacking, 
the defender has little chance of deterring the attack, and U3 has a negative value. The 
only way that the attacker can be deterred is if the expected value of attacking is less than 
the expected value of not attacking (U3) (Watman et al., pp. 19-20). 
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As in any field, there are critics of rational choice theory that do not agree with 
the theory or the use of decision trees in making calculations that aid decision making. 
These critics do not believe that decision making is such an easy process that a simple 
decision tree can depict it. They also feel that the decision makers do not possess enough 
of the "right" information in order to make good decisions, nor do they feel that decision 
makers have the required brain power to process all of the available information during a 
conflict in such a manner that allows a possibility to act on the calculations in a rational 
manner. However, Watman et al. point out that "the only assumptions required by 
rational choice theory are that leaders develop preferences among their alternatives; that 
they rank their preferences ordinally, even if imperfectly; and that they choose the 
alternative best suited to accomplishing their objective, ag~in even if imperfectly". They 
go on to explain that in cases where there is not much information or the information may 
not be fully understood, leaders will still choose the action that gives them the best 
chance to accomplish their goals (p. 21 ). Io 
Although this has been a condensed discussion of rational choice theory, I believe 
that it has demonstrated the validity of the .theory as a way to understand how decisions 
are made. At the most basic level the t):ieory has demonstrated that decisions are not 
made solely by doing simple cost-to-benefit calculations where benefits have to be 
greater than costs in order for something to be worthwhile to pursue. In this instance the 
IO See also, Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence", World Politics (January 1, 1989), 
pp. 214-218; as well as George and Smoke, 1974, pp. 73-77. 
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decision on whether or not to attack relies upon the attacker comparing the costs and 
benefits while also taking into consideration the status quo and future prospects. If the 
future prospects are extremely unappealing the attacker may make decisions that appear 
to be irrational to you and I. 
C. SEEKING GAIN OR AVERTING LOSS (PROSPECT THEORY) 
While the process of decision making in deterrence is generally accepted to be 
based on some type of rational choice, where people make decisions in an attempt to 
maximize their utility, there are cases where leaders act contrary to this theory when they 
know that they will surely lose something rather than gain something. In an attempt to 
supplement rational choice theory in these cases, prospect theory was developed. 
At the most basic level Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky explain that prospect theory 
demonstrates how people make decisions between good and bad choices. Regardless of 
what choice is made, there are three distinctions to be made between prospect theory and 
rational choice theory. First, people think of possible outcomes as either a gain or a loss 
with regards to their current utility, and have an extreme distaste for losses. Second, 
·people do not distinguish very well between large numbers, whether it is money or the 
number of opposition soldiers. And finally, people give more credence to unimportant 
events than they merit, and tend to do the opposite for important events (1988, p. 24). 
To borrow from Bell et al., I would like to pursue further one of their three points 
regarding prospect theory, which is the notion that people behave differently when faced 
with the prospect of loss compared to gain. In an attempt to place this idea in the context 
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of deterrence theory, Watman et al. writes that in prospect theory attackers appear to 
weigh losses more heavily than certain gains in ways that are not explained by comparing 
the values of the decision tree, U 1, U2, and U3 .11 This distinction between seeking gain 
and averting loss helps to explain why deterrence can be unpredictable as well as difficult 
(Watman et al., p. 22).12 
The leader that is facing a loss will more than likely choose an action that risks 
even grea~er losses ~s long as .there is a chance that the loss can be averted. The degree of 
gamble the leader takes depends upon the individual in question, their inclination for risk 
taking, and future prospects. The possibility that a leader will take risks is extremely 
important if the status quo (U3) represents a certain loss, the future prospects are grim, 
and this loss will make the status quo unacceptable. At this point the decisionmaker feels 
that there is only possible gain ahead and nothing to lose by attacking. At this point and 
time the attacker is virtually nondeterrable and only the threat of extreme retaliation, such 
as a direct threat to the leadership of the regime or possibly a nuclear strike, could hope to 
deter the desperate attacker. On the extreme opposite end of the spectrum we have 
11 See also Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under 
Risk", Econometrica (1979), v 47, pp. 263-291; and Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 
"Fact Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk", in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 
(Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982). 
12 Watman et al. explain that a risk-averse decision maker is a person that would rather 
have a sure winner than risk a gamble, even ifthere is a possibility to win more. A risk-
prone decision maker is a person that is just the opposite. This person would pass up a 
sure winner as long as there was a possibility to win more by gambling (p. 23). 
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decisionmakers that are seeking to improve their status quo, which is already acceptable. 
These are the states that are the easiest to deter, because they are averse to taking risks 
that may threaten their acceptable situation (Watman et al., p. 23). 
It is important to realize that the two types of risk taking decision makers, risk-
aversion and risk-prone, do not necessarily adopt an all or nothing approach at all times. 
Instead, decisions usually involve a mixture of both types, which is depicted in Figure 3-
2. 
In the spectrum of risk taking behavior we have the hardest to deter case on the 
left, while the easiest to deter case is on the right. The easiest to deter countries are 
typically the ones that are happy with their status quo and have bright futures. Examples 
of these countries are the United States, Japan, and England. In order for these countries 
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to engage in any risky behavior the likelihood of successful operations must be very high 
prospects of success must be very bright (Watman et al., p. 24). 
On the other end of the spectrum we have the countries that are considered harder 
to deter. These are the countries that make up the list of regional powers or Third World 
countries that do not have the same bright prospects of the· easier to deter states. 
Examples of these countries are Libya, Syria, and Iraq. The prospects of losing one of 
the few things they have, whether it is land or prestige, are unacceptable, and they may do 
nearly anything to keep what they have (Watman et al., p. 24). 
Finally, at the very left of the spectrum we find the nondeterrable state. These are 
the states that have an extremely bleak present outlook, and their future prospects seem to 
be at least as bad. It is quite possible that Saddam Hussein fell into this category before 
invading Kuwait in August 1990, and in the future it is quite possible that North Korea 
and or Cuba could also fall into this category (Watman et al., p. 25). 
Finally, the idea of a so-called crazy state needs to be mentioned in connection 
with nondeterrability. It is possible that a state may be nondeterrable because it is too 
irrational to comprehend a deterrent threat. But in most cases where a state may be 
thought irrational, it is accepting extremely high risks that a Western power would be 
unwilling to accept. With the prospect of serious loss, the state that is seen as a crazy risk 
taker is usually making rational decisions in respect to its future prospects. One possible 
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explanation for why regional foes find themselves in these positions is in the way that 
they are governed (Watman et al., p. 25).13 
D. THE CHARACTER AND MOTIVATION OF REGIONAL FOES 
1. Regime Types 
While an external foe can serve as a credible threat to the attacker's security, 
another threat that is looked upon at least as seriously is the threat presented by domestic 
political foes within the state's own borders. In the past there have been a number of 
instances where these internal domestic threats have caused a number of regional foes to 
have vulnerable and fragile political systems, which are characterized by internal political 
instability. In an effort to take the attention away from the instability, the leaders of these 
countries sometimes engage in international confrontations in an attempt to improve the 
domestic situation. In essence, these regimes are trying to maintain a grip on their power 
at any cost, even at the threat of war. For this reason their stakes .are extremely high, and 
they are willing to accept much more risk than people who are not in their situation can 
comprehend. 
The regime types that Watman et al. discuss are authoritarian, totalitarian, and 
democratic states. Because there are no democratic states that pose a threat, I have 
decided to concentrate on the other two types of regimes. I made this decision because 
the great majo~ity of the third world remains nondemocratic, and these are the regimes 
13 See also Dror, Crazy States (Millwood, New York: Kraus Reprint, 1980). 
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that typically support terrorism and will likely be the regimes with whom we will find 
ourselves in conflict. 
The regimes that will be discussed differ across three criteria: the amount of 
compulsory public participation in regime activities, the amount of pluralism or 
alternative sources of political power, and the extent to which formal ideology plays a 
role in regime legitimacy and behavior. 
Compulsory public participation occurs when the state, with the threat of 
punishment, imposes an obligation where the citizens must take an active part in certain 
political activities. This might require membership in a political organization, taking part 
in state holidays, acting as an informant, etc. 
Degree of pluralism refers to the amount of control that the central government 
relinquishes to the centers of political, economic, and social power. For example, 
bankers, the church, union leaders, etc., may be granted, or already possess power which 
is free from the influence of the government. 
Formal ideology is an intricate code for interpreting the present and the past, 
while also providing us with advice for the future. It creates a plausible explanation for 
the existence of the regime and lists the traits of the leadership that give it the right to rule 
(Watman et al., p. 28). 
a) Autltoritarian regimes 
In an effort to make the state more appealing, authoritarian regimes do not 
require their citizens to participate in any compulsory regime activities. The regime is set 
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up in such a way that the people only have to eomply with the regime's rules. This 
shallow attempt at offering freedom of choice sometimes gives these states the false 
appearance of having democratic principles. 
On a positive note, authoritarian regimes do offer more pluralism than 
totalitarian states do. In doing so the authoritarian states allow specific institutions such 
as the military, the church, and unions a certain amount of independence. In return the 
state expects and usually gets the support of these institutions, which allows it to stay in 
power. 
Because the regime relies on the support of other institutions for its power, 
and not the support of the people, it has to be politically aware at all times. In instances 
where the regime believes its support is waning, or one of the institutions beli.eves it can 
take power, it may have to rely on a balancing act of intimidation, bribery, and political 
favors in order to stay in power. For this reason, authoritarian regimes are often unstable, 
as they are continuously concerned with maintaining their grip on power. To make 
matters even worse, the regime's instability is heightened even more by the fact that the 
regime has very little legitimacy. In many cases, the authoritarian leaders rely upon their 
length of tenure and past accomplishments to justify their hold on power. The instability 
and obsession with domestic security of authoritarian regimes explains the erratic 
behavior these countries. sometimes exhibit and brings to light possible targets to be 
considered by a deterring country. 
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Finally, authoritarian regimes very seldom attempt to impose an ideology 
on their people. They sometimes use nationalism or xenophobia in an attempt to rally the 
political energy of the people to push their interests. One of the things which holds these 
regimes back is that they seldom have the infrastructure to produce or communicate ideas 
on their own initiative (Watman et al., pp. 28-32). 
b) Totalitarian regimes 
Where authoritarian regimes maintained a relatively "hands off' approach 
with their people, totalitarian regimes exert a great deal of pressure on their citizens to 
take partin compulsory public participation. They are able to do this by threatening to 
levy out whatever punishment they deem appropriate for non-compliance. Although the 
required participation of the citizens may vary from extrem.e to slight, in comparison to 
authoritarian regimes it is still quite high. 
Totalitarian regimes have little or no pluralism because there is no other 
source of power besides the state. There may be organizations which appear to have 
power, such as the church or unions, but in reality their power is the product of the state 
and can be turned on or off at any time. These regimes are usually more stable than 
authoritarian regimes because they are not struggling to maintain power. But this 
stability comes at a very high price because the state must maintain a coercive force in 
order to insure domestic security. 
Finally, totalitarian regimes rely quite extensively on ideology in an 
attempt to bolster their legitimacy. The regime relies upon state controlled institutions to 
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maintain and promulgate a structured set of ideals that place the regime as supreme 
(Watman et al., pp. 28-32). 
2. Domestic Political Instability 
As already mentioned, the problem of domestic instability is the primary concern 
of authoritarian and totalitarian leaders. These states are constantly aware that their hold 
on power is tenuous, so they expend a great deal of money and time in dealing with this 
problem. The end result of this extensi~e resource expenditure is a large internal security 
establishment and reduced freedoms for the people. 
At the most basic level most of these states lack credibility with their people 
because they have a difficult time legitimizing their claim to be in power. In an effort to 
compensate for this problem, totalitarian regimes attempt to rectify- the situation by 
relying on ideology. However, in doing so the regime is forced to rely on coercive threats 
if ideology fails. Authoritarian leaders, on the other hand, have an even more difficult 
time in claiming legitimacy, since they do not rely upon ideology as a tool. In an effort to 
make up for a lack of ideology, some of these leaders can speak of their past laurels or of 
their lineage in an attempt to establish legitimacy. Because of the difficulty in 
establishing legitimacy, both types of regimes rely heavily on their internal security 
establishments in an attempt to remain in power (Watman et al., pp. 32-36). 
E. SUMMARY 
Because states such as the ones described in this chapter may pose future threats 
to our national security and interests, it stands to reason that we should strive to 
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understand how they may think and make decisions. The likelihood that there will 
continue to be confrontations with regional powers remains high, as these states continue 
to gain power and may occasionally threaten U.S. citizens, interests, and property. 
Because this likelihood appears to be increasing, I believe that the four points of this 
chapter: rational choice theory; prospect theory; regime type; and domestic instability, 
and how they contribute to the behavior of a regional power, are all very important. By 
studying these points, we learn that these leaders have a different perspective than 
Western leaders. This is an important distinction for our leaders to remember if and when 
a conflict should arise with a regional power. 
While this line of thinking is difficult for many people to comprehend, Roger 
Herbert explains that the number one priority is the survival of the leaders. Sometimes 
the leaders are forced to make some unorthodox decisions in order to guarantee their 
survival. Herbert writes, 
. . . the most powerful determinant of the behavior of Third World leaders 
is a rational calculation of how to ensure their political survival. Instead 
of pursuing policy which will benefit the state, a third world leader will 
make policy decisions based on how a policy will affect his probability of 
remaining in power (1992, p. 84). 
With this in mind it is time to think about how we can modify the behavior 
of these states and their leaders. In the next chapter we will discuss deterrence 
and coercion theory and how they can be used against state-sponsored terrorism. 
43 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
44 
IV. DETERRENCE AND COERCION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
State-sponsored terrorism is a phenomenon that sovereign states increasingly 
worry about. As was discussed earlier, the primary problem in dealing with state 
sponsors of terrorism is that they often hide behind a veil of anonymity by relying on 
terrorist groups as cut-outs to do their bidding. The use of terrorists as agents of a state's 
foreign policy is a relatively low-risk venture, which is usually deniable in public and 
allows the state a face-saving measure in the attempt to avoid the threat of international 
punishment. 
By providing terrorist groups with various types and levels of support, the state 
sponsors of terrorism provide the groups the opportunity to increase their activities. But 
as terrorists and state sponsors become more sophisticated, the states at which terrorism is 
directed may also become more sophisticated. The options available to states for 
countering state-sponsored terrorism will vary, from issuing a warning to taking full-scale 
offensive military action. 
1. Approaches to Combating Terrorism 
Over the years, the policies of the United States, and other like-minded Western 
states which have been targeted by state sponsored terrorism, have been predominantly 
using a "law enforcement model" rather than the other school of thought, an "armed 
conflict" approach. Erickson writes, "The law enforcement approach considers 
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international terrorism as primarily a civil police responsibility. Consequently, this 
approach seeks to improve law enforcement by promoting international agreement and 
cooperation among nations" (1989, p. 57). 
On the other hand, 
The law of armed conflict approach considers international terrorism as 
primarily a military responsibility. Terrorists are viewed as unlawful or 
unprivileged combatants engaging in warlike combatant activity. As such, 
terrorists are criminals whose arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment are 
universal obligations of all states in accordance with the 1949 Geneva 
conventions. When the use of military force abroad is required, such use 
takes place in the context of armed conflict (Erickson, p. 58). 
Both approaches cast the terrorist as a criminal, but under the armed conflict 
model, the terrorists would be seen as engaging in criminal conduct. In either case, the 
law enforcement approach or the armed conflict approach, terrorism is difficult to deter 
because of the targeted state's reliance upon international cooperation either to prosecute 
or extradite the terrorists. 
One reason for the Western line of thinking is that terrorism is not viewed as a 
form of warfare in the eyes of many civilian and military leaders. Many of these leaders 
feel that referring to terrorism as war, rather than a criminal activity, gives credibility to 
the terrorists and makes terrorism more acceptable internationally (Erickson, 1989, p. 62). 
Much like the third world insurgent movements of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, 
international terrorism has been difficult to combat using only the law enforcement 
model. In order for this model to work, there must be international cooperation among 
nations to arrest, prosecute, imprison, and extradite perpetrators of terrorism. Rather than 
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agreeing on the ultimate goal of outlawing terrorism internationally, states have put more 
emphasis on negotiating new treaties in an effort to define specific terrorist acts as crimes 
(Erickson, p. 57). 
2. Extradition and Rendition 
In an effort to combat international terrorism without complete cooperation, the 
Reagan administration began proposing legislation to change our CT policy in the 1980s. 
David Tucker writes, " ... as indicated ?Y the emphasis on international conventions and 
the extradition of suspected terrorists, the judicial or legal approach to counterterrorism 
had been an important part of the U.S. government's policy from the beginning". He 
goes on to explain that the U.S. policy towards counterterrorism began to change after the 
Iran-Contra fiasco. In an effort to reinvigorate U.S. counterterrorism policy, President 
Reagan proposed several new laws dealing with terrorism between 1984 and 1986. The 
most important of these proposed laws to pass was the Act for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Hostage Taking. This new law made it a criminal act, under U.S. law, to 
take a U.S. citizen hostage overseas. The law also gave the FBI the jurisdiction to 
investigate the hostage taking and arrest the perpetrators overseas and bring them back to 
the U.S. for trial. While the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction had existed before the 
new law was passed, this law as well as the 1986 Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Act expanded 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and increased the priority of the FBI in using law enforcement 
in combating terrorism overseas (1997, p. 43). 
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Tucker explains that the increased interest in extraterritorial jurisdiction also came 
about because of the failure of multilateral conventions and international law. The U.S. 
government felt a great deal of frustration over deficiencies of these conventions that 
were supposed to be used as tools to fight terrorism. "Whatever its origin, the application 
of U.S. law outside U.S. territory and, consequently, the capture of indicted terrorists 
overseas or their extradition or rendition to the United States became after Iran-Contra an 
increasingly important weapon against terrorism" (p. 43). 14 In a testament to the utility 
of the strategy, the U.S. has conducted twelve successful extraditions/renditions ·of 
terrorists from March 1993 to December 1998 (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, p. 
97). 
In the event that terrorist incidents are committed at_ the bidding of a state sponsor, 
Prunckun and Mohr state that once you know or believe that the terrorist acts being 
committed against your country are either directly or indirectly the hostile act of another 
state, this provides your country a visible foe and allows for diplomatic or military 
responses. The possible responses include, at the diplomatic level, the imposition of 
military, economic, or political sanctions, and at the military level, retaliation with the 
aim of deterring or coercing state sponsors of terrorism (1997, p. 268). 
Because the focus of this thesis is on the range of military responses to state-
sponsored terrorism; I will be exploring how states might be deterred from sponsoring 
14 For additional information on U.S. counterterrorism policy as well as rendition and 
extradition, see Tucker, pp. 1-50. 
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terrorism, or coerced into ceasing their sponsorship using military means. I will attempt 
to develop a framework that can be applied to a state sponsor of terrorism to determine if 
a strategy of deterrence or coercion can alter that state's behavior. If there are states that 
fall within this framework, I will suggest a list of critical nodes to be targeted by the 
military in an effort to carry out a successful deterrent or coercion strategy against the 
state sponsor of terrorism. 
In an effort to lay out a coherent theory of deterrence, I have decided to use the 
Watman et al. book, US. Regional Deterrence Strategies, as a base document. This work 
is appropriate for this thesis because it focuses on regional engagements, and because the 
authors delineate the effects of deterrence on different types of state govenunents such as 
totalitarian and authoritarian regimes and their domestic political instability. This 
delineation is important to evaluate the deterrence and coercion of terrorism because 
some of the countries listed as sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department are 
totalitarian or authoritarian regional powers. 
B. DETERRENCE THEORY 
Most of today's literature credits the Cold War and the West's strategy of 
deterring the Soviets as the source of our current theory of deterrence.IS The Cold War 
15 For a brief di~cussion on the different strategies of U.S. deterrence prior to the atomic 
age, such as: show of force, limited warfare, balance of power, etc., see George and 
Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 12-20; and Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1966). 
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and the developing nuclear technology played key roles in fostering ideas about 
deterrence, which called for threatening the enemy with overwhelming punishment for 
his aggression, or at least with costs that were greater than the value he attached to a 
possible strategic objective.16 This early strategy became known as general deterrence. 17 
With the end of the Cold War, U.S. national security strategy shifted from a focus 
on the former Soviet Union and it's nuclear threat to possible regional conflicts. As a 
consequence, the applicability of U.S. regional strategy had to be reexamined because it 
was formulated with the thought of regional conflicts with the Soviet Union's proxies in 
mind. 
The primary aspect of the regional strategy that needed to be reevaluated was the 
role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. ·It was nuclear weapons that played the decisive 
deterrent role in the U.S. strategy to counter the Soviets, because the U.S. believed the 
Soviets were deterrable and because the thought of going to war with the Soviets was 
16 John Mearsheimer provides a different point of view in his book, Conventional 
Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), by stating that from the early 1960s 
the U.S. primarily relied upon conventional forces to deter the Soviets, rather than nuclear 
weapons (p. 13). This was the dawn of "flexible response" in Europe. 
17 Shortly after the Eisenhower administration came to power, a new planning document, 
NSC-162/2 was implemented. The new policy, which was known as "massive 
retaliation", was thought of as the first systematic theory of deterrence in the cold war era. 
Massive retaliation was replaced in the late 1950s with a doctrine that was known as 
"Graduated Deterrence", which called for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. When the 
Kennedy administration took office, it brought in a policy known as "Flexible Response", 
which gave the President "multiple options" with which to respond with (George and 
Smoke, 1974, pp. 26-55). See also Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 189, where he 
discusses that massive retaliation was a "doctrine in decline" from the start. 
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unacceptable. This strategy is now dated because most of our potential regional 
adversaries do not possess nuclear weapons or the technology to deliver them to the U.S. 
Since the U.S. has pledged not to threaten nonnuclear states with a nuclear attack, U.S. 
regional deterrence strategy will have to rely primarily upon conventional threats. 
Watman et al. define deterrence as "dissuading a leader, group, or state from 
acting against another state's interests by threatening to impose some sanctions or cost" 
(1995, p. 13). They go on to explain that deterrence " ... is a part of a larger set of 
strategies for influencing a country's behavior". For example, ". . . one can dissuade an 
opponent from acting against one's interests by offering rewards. or inducements if the 
opponent acts according to one's wishes, or by threatening sanctions or retaliation if the 
opponent does not" (p. 13). 
Because this thesis is focusing on military responses to state-sponsored terrorism, 
in this section I will discuss the use of the military to deter, and the threat of retaliation 
the military provides. As with any deterrent tool, when the military is used, deterrence 
requires credible U.S. threats to deny the adversary's objectives (a denial strategy) 
perhaps with additional thr-eats to punish the regime (a punishment strategy). Credible 
threats are imperative. For a deterrence strategy to succeed, the adversary must believe 
the threats. If they do not believe the threats to be credible they will carry on with their 
planned actions. 
Deterrence by denial, the favored strategy of Watman et al. focuses on 
discouraging a foe from attacking by convincing him that he cannot attain his military or 
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political goals with the use of force, or that the costs for attaining these goals will be too 
high. Denial works by threatening a foe's military forces, especially those that are 
capable of projecting power outside of the foe's borders. For this reason denial is oft-
times referred to as a countermilitary deterrent strategy in that. our military threat 
discourages an opponent from attacking (p. 16). 
Deterrence by punishment attempts to discourage a foe from attacking by 
threatening to destroy and or take away what the foe values the most. For this reason it is 
often referred to as a countervalue strategy. One way in which this is accomplished is by 
threatening civilian economic targets. Punishment can also focus on a much broader set 
of targets such as a foe's diplomatic contingent in a foreign country, economic interests, 
and its political structure. These targets of value may include the military forces, but the 
goal is not to deny the foe's military goals. The focus of this strategy is to inflict such 
great pain upon a country that any benefits the country may attain by attacking are 
outweighed by the losses they will incur (Watman et al., p. 16).18 
Watman et al. break the military aspects of regional deterrence into two factors: 
first, different ways in which the U.S. can make its deterrent threats credible and second, 
the military capabilities required for credible denial and punishment threats (p. x). These 
18 For additional discussion on deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment see 
Snyder, Deterrence By Denial and Punishment (Princeton: Center oflntemational 
Studies, 1958), pp. 1-8; as well as Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), pp. 14-51. 
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factors, though slightly different than the Watman et al. explanation of deterrence, will be 
the foundation for my explanation of deterrence. 
1. Credibility 
Credibility is composed of two parts. The first part of credibility is whether the 
adversary believes that the U.S. intends to go through with its deterrent threat. This 
usually depends upon the strength of the U.S. interests in an area and how the adversary 
understands and reacts to these interests. Along with present interests, future interests 
must also be considered. The potential foe must consider the likelihood that the U.S. will 
attempt to enforce its threat when deterrence is tested in the future. The second part of 
credibility is whether the adversary believes the U.S. is capable of carrying out what it 
threatens. This depends upon the foe's understanding of the military balance between its 
country and the U.S. If either the intent or capability is lacking, foes will likely disregard 
U.S. deterrent threats. If both are present in sufficient amounts, U.S. deterrent threats 
should be perceived as being highly credible. In instances where one of these attributes 
of credibility is somewhat weak, the other must compensate in order for deterrence to be 
successful (Watman et al., p. 57). 
The intentions of the United States are comprised of two primary variables: 




In order for a deterrent threat to be credible, a state's interests must be 
strong. The interests of the U.S. in a region are brought to light by political, economic, 
and military ties between the United States and a regional ally or friend. Attempts to 
convince regional foes that the U.S. does have important longstanding interests at stake in 
a particular region should have a substantial deterrent effect. Establishing different types 
of commitments and agreements, such. as defense relationships with our regional ally or 
friend will establish our interest. By establishing these commitments, and making them 
believable, a state is much more likely to commit itself successfully in the defense of 
another state.19 However, for a foe to believe that the U.S. is d~eply committed to the 
defense of a particular interest, the commitment must be strong, specific, and set up over 
a period of time. This can be accomplished by establishing different commitments and 
agreements, such as military arrangements or alliances with the regional ally or friend. 
Because of the great political and monetary costs required to maintain our interests, the 
U.S. can be engaged in such a way as to show our interests in only a few places. In the 
areas where our interests may not be that strong, our reputation for doing what we say 
may be able to bolster this deficiency and assist in acting as a sufficient deterrent threat 
(Watman et al., p. 58). 
19 See also Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988). 
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While I have explained how interests can be important to demonstrate 
countries' commitment, the way these interests are expressed can also prove to be an aid 
to the state sponsor of terrorism in targeting the country exercising its interests. Because 
of this reason, I feel that this is an area in which Watman and Wilkening's work must be 
modified in an attempt to take account of state sponsors of terrorism and the easy targets 
a state's interests may provide. By showing a strong interest in a regional ally or friend, 
the U.S. commitment may actually create a vulnerability by .providing a reason or 
justification for a state sponsor of terrorism to target the interests of the U.S. 
Oft-times our presence and influence in a region serve as a point of 
contention. Because regional powers cannot compete with our military on a head to head 
basis or they wish to remain anonymous, they may use state-sponsored terrorism in an 
attempt to target the U.S. in an effort to rid themselves of our influence and presence. 
Some examples of this strategy are the Osama Bin Laden-sponsored attacks on Kho bar 
Towers, and the U.S. embassies in Africa, as well as Iranian sponsored terrorism 
throughout the Middle East. 
b) Reputation 
Reputation refers to the behavior history of a state, and just like history, it 
cannot be created when a crisis arrives. In the instances where a strong U.S. interest is 
lacking, the reputation for doing what it says it will do can go a long way toward 
reinforcing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats. However, state reputations are 
evanescent and often tied to a specific leader, a specific type of interest, and a specific 
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type of warfare. Reputation also seems to be tied to a particular foe or region and is not 
perceived the same by these different bodies. A consequence of forgotten or 
misperceived reputation is that U.S. interests are sometimes challenged, which forces us 
to defend these with our military and begin a new cycle of rebuilding our reputation 
(Watman et al., pp. 58-59).20 
In instances where interests or reputation are not enough to convey the 
level of resolve of a state to defend its interests, bargaining tactics and perceptions of 
legitimacy can play a role in strengthening the level of resolve. 
c) Bargaining tactics 
Watman et al. tell us that Thomas Schelling was the first person to come 
up with a systematic list of bargaining tactics that are important for deterrence. They go 
on to explain that some of the tactics are: '"rationality of irrationality", i.e., convincing an 
opponent that a threat will be carried out even if it hurts the defender (this could be an 
aspect of the leadership's reputation); convincing an opponent that he has the "last clear 
chance" to avoid the confrontation (i.e., relinqui~hing controls over events, for example, 
by making retaliation automatic if the proscribes action occurs); and clear public 
declarations on one's intent to defend an ally, which makes it hard to back down from the 
commitment without incurring some damage to one's reputation (i.e., tying one's hands 
20 Jonathan Mercer provides a detailed account of how reputation relates to the 
effectiveness of deterrence in his book, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 14-43. 
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to some extent)." While it is debatable how these tactics can be employed by leaders of 
states or how effective they will be, one should at least be aware that bargaining tactics 
can have some affect on perceptions of credibility (p. 60).21 
d) Perceptions of legitimacy 
The perceived legitimacy of the defender's interests, or of his choice of 
defensive measures, may also affect perceptions of the defender's resolve. If the foe 
believes the defender's claim to an interest is legitimate, or that its own claim is not as 
legitimate, the foe is likely to believe that the defender has greater resolve in defending 
that claim. This idea of legitimacy can be used in analyzing the methods used to defend 
interests. Certain types of weapons or certain types of warfare, such as those used by 
terrorists, may be perceived by the international community as illegitimate for defending 
or advancing a state's interests. For example to whatever degree the foe believes the 
defender has legitimate claims, the foe may believe that the defender has greater resolve 
to deter these threatened claims. The foe does not have to agree with the perspective of 
the defender that specific claims or means are illegitimate. The only thing that matters is 
that the adversary believes that the defender holds these beliefs (Watman et al., pp. 60-
61). 
21 For further information on bargaining tactics see Schelling, Arms and Influence (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 35-91. .,, 
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2. Military Capabilities 
In the cases where interest and reputation are not enough to deter a regional foe, 
military capabilities may compensate~ Military capabilities become a credible deterrent 
threat when potential foes become convinced that we can respond with overwhelming 
force by threatening to use any of the following: the local military balance of forces as a 
denial strategy, punishment strategy, conventional forces, and nuclear weapons. 
a) The local military balance as a denial strategy 
When regional foes typically resort to conflict, one of their primary goals 
is to avoid a long, drawn out war of attrition. It should come as no surprise that all states, 
regardless of size, desire a short war, but it is even more important for regional states for 
a number of reasons. First, the financial, military, and human costs oflong wars are often 
difficult to sustain and to eventually recover from for small states. Second, long wars 
bring to light domestic political instabilities and often times free uncontrollable political 
forces that can bring down a regime. In contrast, wars that are won quickly and relatively 
inexpensively are quite popular and often times bolster the image and power of the 
regime.22 
Because regional powers prefer short wars, the U.S. military forces that 
can deny this quick and decisive victory will serve as an imposing adversary and credible 
22 Huth and Mearsheimer discuss three possible options available to a potential attacker 
that is faced with a balance of forces situation, they are: limited aims strategy, rapid 
offensive/blitzkrieg strategy, and an attrition strategy. See Mearsheimer, pp. 23-66; and 
Huth, pp. 33-41. 
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deterrent against the regional foe. The U.S. forces that could most successfully deny this 
quick victory would be a forward stationed or rapid deployment force. Another less 
successful denial possibility would be later arriving ground troops. Of these three 
options, the forward-stationed troops would be the most enticing choice because the 
forward deployment of these forces shows that the U.S. is committed to the region. 
While a rapid deployment force would also serve as a good deterrent, it would not be as 
effective as the forward-deployed for~es because of the requirement for a political 
decision to send the forces. If a foe believes that the political will to send such forces is 
lacking, the rapid deployment forces would be a less effective deterrent than the forward 
deployed forces. Finally, the later arriving forces are not really ~ option in regional 
deterrence, unless we already have a strong commitment, because of the great effort, 
time, and cost to deploy these forces (Watman et al., pp. 67-69). 
The local military balance is another area where I feel that Watman and 
Wilkening's focus on conventional forces and battles can be modified in an attempt to 
apply it to the problem of state sponsored terrorism. Watman et al. talk about states 
wanting to avoid long drawn out conventional wars for a number of reasons. While the 
local balance of military power is able to deter states from using their conventional 
military to try and win a quick war, it does not work against regional powers that sponsor 
terrorism. State-sponsors of terrorism adopt this approach because they cannot compete 
militarily, and they want to avoid direct confrontation and retaliation. It is also cheaper 
for them to support terrorists to do their bidding rather than paying for a military to 
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directly confront the U.S. If the state-sponsors of terrorism can wage a protracted 
terrorist campaign against the U.S., they will be more successful than in a direct military 
confrontation, which will be over quickly, but not to their liking. 
While our deployment of forces to a region shows great commitment and 
serves as a credible deterrent threat, it may also serve as a catalyst for dissent. These 
forward-deployed forces may also serve as a target of opportunity for a state sponsored 
terrorist attack. · Examples of this scenario are the bombing of the Marine barracks in 
Lebanon as well as the bombing of.Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. 
b) Punishment strategy 
In the event that the local balance of military forces does not deter a foe, 
the threat of punishment may be required. In order to· have a credible punishment 
strategy, the defender must determine what the foe values most, and than threaten it with 
destruction. Most nondemocratic regimes place the highest value on their ability to stay 
in power rather than on the welfare of their populace. They typically rely on the support 
of selected individuals and organizations for their support and power base. By 
threatening to destroy these supporters of the regime, a defender could possibly exert a 
large amount of influence over these leaders. 
By conducting a punishment campaign against the regime's stability, the 
leadership and their closest advisors could be singled out for targeting. If this strategy is 
selected, there are serious implications to consider. The first considerations deal with 
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moral and legal issues. 23 Second, by targeting leaders, the executing state may be putting 
their own leadership in peril. Third, if the strategy is successful, the unintended 
consequences of this successful strategy may be worse than the actions the defender was 
trying to deter. For example, the assassinated leader may become a martyr or the new 
leader may be harder to deter and may pose an even greater threat than the previous 
leader. Finally, the targeting of leaders is a very difficult operation. For these reasons, it 
may be more appropriate to target the infrastructure, people and machines, which keep 
the regime in power. 24 
Regardless of the punishment strategy selected, the defender must be 
aware of how vulnerable regimes are to this type of action. If we target the regime's 
power or stability, they may feel so threatened that they are forced to commit . an 
undesirable action in an effort to deal with the threat and stay in power (Watman et al., 
pp. 72-75). In extreme cases, the adversary being targeted may commit retaliatory strikes 
against the country carrying out the punishment strategy. Examples of retaliatory strikes 
against the U.S. include the Libyan-sponsored bombing of Pan Am flight 103, and the 
failed Iraqi-sponsored as~assination attempt of President George Bush. 
23 While the definition of assassination is unclear, it is illegal in the U.S. to target foreign 
leaders directly. 
24 For additional information on counterleadership targeting, see Hebert, Roger G., 
Bullets with Names: The Deadly Dilemma (Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School, 
1992); and Taylor, Bradly S., Counterleadership Targeting and Conflict Termination 
(Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1999). 
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c) Conventional forces 
A favorable local military balance of power does not ensure successful 
regional deterrence for a number of reasons. First, regional foes may not perceive the 
actual balance, or they may overestimate their own ability to defeat the local U.S. and 
allied forces. These misperceptions sometimes come about due to ignorance, but they 
also can be the products of the over use of the threat of conventional military forces as 
tools of deterrence. 
Second, the deployment of conventional forces to a region is unlikely 
because it is time consuming, costly, and an intricate undertaking. Even if the forces are 
deployed, the outcome of conventional wars is reliant upon a number of factors, which 
are difficult to quantify, such as, skill, doctrine, and technology. Finally, the U.S. can no 
longer rely upon nuclear weapons as a deterrent threat, and must rely more upon 
conventional forces to fill this role. 
In an effort to pump up the effectiveness of conventional military forces as 
a deterrent, Watman and Wilkening have two suggestions. First, make the capabilities of 
U.S. conventional forces as transparent as possible. Fighting· periodic wars in which 
weapons systems are showcased could do this, but a better and more plausible solution 
would be to conduct intense and realistic exercises. By tailoring these deliberate 
capability revelations to highlight what possible foes believe to be our deficiencies, we 
may be able to deter future aggression. Second, the U.S. could advertise the testing and 
subsequent results of weapons systems. Just as in the first example, by highlighting the 
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capabilities of our weapons systems, we may be able to deter future aggression (p. 77-
79).25 
d) Nuclear weapons 
Even with the improvements in technology and lethality in conventional 
weapons, these forces will more than likely never have the same deterrence effect as 
nuclear weapons. The undeniable power of a nuclear weapon is unquestionably 
impressive when compared to even our largest conventional munitions. For this reason, it 
is imperative that the U.S. does not relinquish the possibility of using nuclear weapons in 
a regional conflict. This becomes even truer now that some regional powers that sponsor 
terrorism are kllown to have acquired, or are actively working on acquiring NBC 
weapons. 
The primary problem with using nuclear weapons as a deterrent in 
regional conflicts is to make the threat credible. Just as regional foes tend to discount the 
probable mobilization of our conventional forces, they will also tend to discount our 
nuclear capability if they feel that we are constrained by moral and political 
considerations. This is believed to be the case in the U.S., when we pledged not to 
threaten nonnuclear states with nuclear attack, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
25 For additional insight into these ideas on deliberate capabilities revelation and how 
they may affect deterrence see, Lewis, Getting More Deterrence out of Deliberate 
Capability Revelation (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1989). 
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There are three limited scenarios in which the U.S. retains the right to use 
nuclear weapons against regional foes: first, in response to a foe's first use of nuclear 
weapons; second, in response to a foe's use of chemical or biological weapons; and 
finally, in response to an adversary's threat to overrun a major U.S. ground unit, even if 
the threat is totally conventional in nature. 
If the U.S. chooses to continue with a nuclear option against possible 
regional foes, it must avoid provoking those countries that do not have nuclear weapons, 
into procuring them. We need to continue with our policy that emphasizes conventional 
military options, while condemning the first use of NBC weapons. Finally, the U.S. 
should never act in such a way that regional powers are certain that we will not use 
nuclear weapons under any circumstances (Watman et al., pp. 79-81). 
In closing Watman et al. discuss the fact that the U.S. faces fewer strategic 
threats and that in the future deterrence may become an option in our regional strategy 
rather than a necessity. The high monetary cost and difficulty associated with deterrence 
may force the U.S. to choose where and when it exercises this option. For these reasons 
it may be more cost effective to occasionally fight a regional foe rather than paying the 
high costs associated with having a credible deterrent strategy (Watman and Wilkening, 
p. 83). 
C. COERCION THEORY 
As in the case of deterrence, the cold war and the developing nuclear technology 
also played key roles in developing ideas about coercion. But in the case of coercion, the 
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number of nuclear weapons available to both sides made the idea of a large-scale 
conventional war unacceptable, even for the victor, because of the possibility of an 
escalation to use of nuclear weapons. According to Stephen Cimbala, "... nuclear 
weapons technology created a compelling interest in both ways to limit war and military 
strategy involving the calibrated use, and threat, of force" (1998, p. 23). The two sides 
were able to do this by pursuing the idea of limited war, and by also keeping their allies 
from provoking each other all the while controlling the risks of nuclear escalation 
(Cimbala, 1998, pp. 10-18). 26 
The end of the cold war and the demise of the former Soviet Union have brought 
an end to the threat of global and or nuclear war, while also reducing the national security 
threats to the U.S. and its allies. However, the end of the cold war has ·also increased the 
likelihood of Western intervention in response to things such as: the rise of regional 
hegemonies; i;iuclear, chemical, biological and contamination proliferation; ethnic 
conflict; civil wars; etc. According to Robert Pape, "the problem of the cold war was 
deterrence; the problem of the post-cold-war era is coercion" (1996, p. 329). Cimbala 
writes "the Gulf War demonstrated that the demise of the Soviet Union had left the 
United States in a unique position of undisputed conventional and military superpower. 
No state could threaten the United States with large-scale military defeat ... " (1998, p. 
39). 
26 See also, Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960, especially pp. 257-266; and 
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1966. 
65 
The theory of coercion, much like that of deterrence, relies upon efforts to affect 
the behavior of an opponent by manipulating costs and benefits. While deterrence works 
at "dissuading a leader, group, or state from acting against another states interests by 
threatening to impose some sanctions or costs" (Watman and Wilkening, p. 13); 
"coercion involves persuading an opponent to stop an ongoing action or to start a new 
course of action by changing its calculations of costs and benefits" (Pape, 1996, p. 12). 
Coercion is inherently harder to do than deterrence because the state attempting to 
operationalize coercion theory is going against a state that has already finished an action. 
If the opponent is successful in its actions it will be difficult to get it to stop what it is 
doing or undo the action. In order for coercion to be effective, two elements must be 
present; first, a credible threat to inflict extremely high cos_ts if the threat is not complied 
with; and second, a promise to withhold the punitive action if the opponent being 
threatened complies with the threat (Cimbala, 1994, p. 169). 
Mark Sullivan explains the differences between deterrence and coercion as: 
Deterrence discourages action through fear of consequences. It involves 
communicating national interests and resolve, then waiting, in a reactive 
mode. Deterrence is defensive in nature and overt action is left up to the 
belligerent. Coercion, on the other hand, applies to conflicts short of war, 
as well as full-fledged armed conflict. It requires overt action, or the 
threat of action by the coercer. The threat that compels rather than deters 
often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, 
rather than if he acts. Its purpose is to force concessions prior to the full 
prosecutions of military strategy (1995, p. 6).27 
27 For additional information on the difference between deterrence and coercion, see Art, 
"To What Ends Military Power", International Security (Spring 1980) no 4, pp. 3-35; and 
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960, and Schelling, Arms and Influence 1966. 
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In keeping with the theme of this thesis, which focuses on the range of military 
responses to state-sponsored terrorism, I will be exploring in this section how states 
might be coerced into ceasing their sponsorship of terrorism using primarily military 
means. 
In an effort to lay out one coherent theory of coercion, I have decided to primarily 
use the Stephen Cimbala book, Coercive Military Strategy, as a base document. This 
work is appropriate because it compiles the ideas that competing theories put forth in an 
attempt to construct one strategy. In making his case for coercive military strategy, 
Cimbala relies heavily upon the works of Alexander George on coercive diplomacy, as 
well as the works of Robert Pape on military coercion, which I will also be using. 
1. " Coercive Military Strategy 
Cimbala explains that a coercive military strategy " ... is one that explicitly seeks 
to employ deliberately calibrated means in order to accomplish policy objectives, while 
adjusting its ends and means relationship to the evolving situation and context" (1998, p. 
4). In constructing his theory and argument, Cimbala combines the theories of "coercive 
diplomacy'', "compellence'', 28 and "deterrence'', which have already been discussed, in 
28 The term "compellence" was first used by Schelling in his book Arms and Influence. 
Compellence is the same word that Robert Pape is referring to when he uses the term 
coercion. Both words speak of forcing an opponent to alter his behavior. See Schelling, 
Arms and Influence, pp. 69-91; and Pape, "Coercion and Military Strategy: Why Denial 
Works and Punishment Doesn't", The Journal of Strategic Studies (December 1992), v 
15, no 4, , pp. 423-465; and Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), pp. 4-54. For the remainder of this thesis, the words compellence and military 
coercion are treated as being synonymous. 
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order to create his coercive military strategy. It is important to note that Cimbala is using 
these theories together to form a single hybrid strategy, while in other cases, and or 
works, they have been stand-alone strategies. In this instance he argues, 
... that coercive military strategy is one aspect of persuasion supported by 
the threat or use of force. The use of force may not be for the purpose of 
combat, although it can be. Force can also be used effectively for political 
purposes by being threatened but not used. Sometimes troops are moved 
to a border, or ships are steamed toward another country's harbor, simply 
to send a message. The message may be ambiguous but nevertheless 
powerful, opening the possibility of violent clashes between armed 
combatants" without . closing the door to further negotiation between 
potential · adversaries. Its subtlety and dexterity recognize coercive 
strategy, even when it is necessary to employ a blunt edge. Coercion 
flows around and envelops a target instead of crushing it. Coercion works 
on the enemy's mind and brain in the first instance, and on the enemy's 
"body" of fighting forces and logistics in the second, as a means of 
mastery of the enemy's soul (Cimbala, 1998, p. 156). 
According to Cimbala, a good coercive military strategy possesses at least five 
attributes or characteristics, which are listed below. 
a) Influencing the Will 
Cimbala writes, "a coercive milit~ strategy has as its primary objective 
the task of influencing the opponent's will" (1998, p. 162). But in influencing the 
opponent's will, one should not forget about the option of using military operations to 
target the capabilities of the opponent as well. The use of a coercive military strategy 
calls for using calibrated, but not always small, amounts of destruction, in an effort to 
change the opponent's perceptions of its own cost-to-benefits ratio if it continues 
following the same path. The coercing power is able to do this through the use of force 
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or the threat of force in two instances. First, the coercing power attempts to influence the 
opponent's estimate of its intentions and capabilities; and second, the coercing power 
attempts to influence the opponent's estimate of its own intentions and capabilities as the 
crisis continues. 
An implicit facet of coercive military strategy is a willingness sometimes 
to accept less than total victory, or perhaps even accepting less than the original war aims. 
h) Openness to Revision 
The use of a coercive strategy sometimes requires that one keep an open 
mind to the possibility of revising one's own military and political objectives without 
necessarily giving in to the opponent's objectives. The primary reason for this line of 
thinking is that both sides go into the conflict with their own distorted definitions of what 
relative gains and losses are relative to their own objectives. When these definitions 
prove to be false, states are forced to revise their objectives by either becoming more or 
less ambitious. Many states and leaders have entered into a conflict believing it would be 
short lived, only to see their planned upon ending date come and go. 
c) Perspective Taking 
It is important for states to be able to identify and understand the 
objectives and motives of their opponents. Cimbala uses the analogy of "falling 
dominoes" to explain that in some instances states may feel that by giving in on any point 
all others will be in jeopardy (p. 165). Even if this is not the case, parties out of power 
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can threaten the regime's stability and power by· taking advantage of the falling domino 
analogy. 
d) Symbolic Manipulation 
Another important part of a coercive strategy is the ability to manipulate 
information and key symbols in support of the regime's political and military objectives. 
Because people often believe what they are told and take the information as fact, having 
the ability to control the means of information distribution is critical today. 
e) Moral Influence 
Finally, in what Cimbala believes to be the most important characteristic 
of a coercive military strategy, we have moral influence. By this he means that the aims 
of a war and the methods to wage the war must be supported by the people, government, 
and the military members directed to carry them out. If these conditions are met and 
maintained, a nation should be successful in its campaign-unless it happens to meet 
another state just as committed (Cimbala, pp. 162-171). 
2. Coercive Diplomacy 
The term coercive diplomacy, which was popularized by political scientist 
Alexander George, refers to a "defensive strategy that attempts to persuade an opponent 
to stop or undo an aggressive action ... by the threat of force or a limited exemplary use of 
force as a means of restoring peace in a diplomatic crisis.29 The hope is that these . 
29 By "exemplary", George means," ... the use of just enough force of an appropriate 
kind to demonstrate resolution to protect one's interests and to establish the credibility of 
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measures will lead to a diplomatic solution that will save lives in the long run by avoiding 
a much greater use of force later" (George, 1991, p. ix). At the very core of this theory, 
George states, "the general intent of coercive diplomacy is to back a demand on an 
adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent 
enough to persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand" (1994, p. 2). 
Figure 4-1 depicts that this strategy is intended to accomplish one of three 
possible goals: first, to persuade an opponent to stop short of a goal (Type A, the easiest 
variant); second, to persuade an opponent to undo an action which has already been 
committed (Type B, a harder variant); and third, to persuade an opponent to make a 
change in its government or in its regime (Type C, the most difficult variant) (George, 
1994, p. 8). 
George goes on to explain that the concept focuses only on defensive uses of 
coercive diplomacy, "that is, efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action", 
one's determination to use more force if necessary. The strategy of coercive diplomacy, 
however, does not require use of exemplary actions. The crisis may be satisfactorily 
resolved without an exemplary use of force; or the strategy of coercive diplomacy may be 
abandoned in favor of full-scale military operations without a preliminary use of 
exemplary force" (1991, pp. 5-6). 
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and does not include the use of offensive coercion ( compellence) or blackmail alone. It is 
also different from deterrence, in that it attempts to stop or reverse an opponent's actions 
that are already under way rather than to dissuade him from undertaking a damaging 
action not yet initiated. As an alternative to military action it seeks to persuade rather 
than force an opponent into changing his actions (George, 1991, p. 5 and 1994, p. 7). 
a) Policy Tasks Required for Coercive Diplomacy 
In order for George's model° of coercive diplomacy to be transformed into 
a successful strategy, there are four tasks that must be accomplished by the policy maker 
prior to this happening. The first task is to design a specific strategy. of coercive 
diplomacy. This includes determining what to demand of the opponent; whether and how 
to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand; what punishment to 
threaten (the stick) for noncompliance, and how to make it potent and credible; and 
whether or not to offer positive inducements (the carrot) for compliance (George, 1994, 
pp. 16-17). 
The second task is to select a type or variant of coercive diplomacy to be 
implemented. George has identified four variants: the classic ultimatum, the tacit 
ultimatum, the "gradual turning of the screw", and the try-and-see approach" (George, 
1994, pp. 18-19). 
The third task for the policy maker is to set aside the idea that he is facing 
a "rational" opponent and to replace it with an empirically designed understanding of the 
opponent's motivations and goals. Man is not able to correctly process all of the 
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incoming information because of internal and external measures, that include 
psychological, cultural, and political factors (George, 1994, pp. 19-20). 
I feel that this is a very astute observation that directly applies to the 
regional powers that are state sponsors of terrorism. Some of the unique factors of these 
regional powers, such as the characteristics of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, make 
these unique cases that merit special consideration. 
The final task for the policy maker is to carefully examine the context of 
the crisis, while paying even more attention to how the context will influence the 
effectiveness of the coercive strategy (George, 1994, p. 20). 
b) Favorable Conditions for Coercive Diplomacy 
'· George studied a number of cases of coercive diplomacy, including one 
that involved a U.S. military response to Libyan state-sponsored terrorism in Operation 
El Dorado Canyon. In some of the cases the selected variant of coercive diplomacy was 
successful, while in others it did not achieve the desired objective, or was abandoned in 
favor of the use of full-scale military force. Because coercive diplomacy is not always 
successful, George believes, ". . . it is important to identify conditions that, if present, 
favor its success or, if absent, reduce the likelihood of its being effective" (George, 1994, 
p. 279). He is very careful to stress that no variable alone is responsible for the success or 
failure of coercive diplomacy. The list of conditions which favor a successful coercive 
diplomacy strategy are: 
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The first condition is clarity of objective. This condition is concerned with 
the clarity of the objective to be achieved through coercive diplomacy in two respects. 
First, it guides policy makers, who have a number of available response options to choose 
from, such as: warnings, sanctions, positive inducements, and the use of force. Second, a 
clear and consistent demand ensures that the adversary understands the demand and the 
will of the coercing power. 
The second condition is the strength of motivation. In this condition the 
coercing state niust have an important interest or stake in a crisis in order to be 
sufficiently motivated to act. The motivation must be strong enough to gain the support 
of the national decision-makers as to whether or not to accept the costs and risks, which 
are part of pursuing a coercive strategy. The key element to this condition is the 
perception that the decision-makers have of the interest level of the populace once key 
decisions have to be made. 
The third condition is asymmetry of motivation. In this condition it is 
important to understand that motivation is two-sided and that each side has an idea of 
what is at stake in the dispute, that each side places a certain level of importance on their 
interests engaged in the conflict, and that each side is willing to incur a certain level of 
costs and risks on behalf of those interests. 
While it is important to be sufficiently motivated, it is more critical that 
the opponent believes that the coercing power is r~latively more motivated to achieve the 
objective. In some instances where the motivation is fixed for some reason, it is possible 
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that the side using coercive diplomacy may be able to create an asymmetry of motivation 
in its favor in two ways: first, by not making large demands that threaten the opponent's 
vital interests; and second, by offering a carrot that reduces the opponent's motivation to 
resist the demands, as well as allowing for "face saving". 
The fourth condition is a sense of urgency. The key component of this 
condition is the perception of a sense of urgency by the opponent. If the coercing state 
demonstrates a genuine sense of urgency while trying to achieve its objective, it will be 
more likely to convey a sense of urgency on the opponent to comply with their demands. 
If this does not work, the coercing power must find alternative means to convey a 
credible sense of urgency for compliance. One of the best ways to bring about a sense of 
urgency is to use a classic ultimatum, which imposes a time limit or a sense _of urgency 
for compliance with the demand. 
The fifth condition is strong leadership. A strong and effective leadership 
team, for the coercing power as well as the opponent, is extremely important when it 
comes to choosing, implementing, and finishing a strategy of coercive diplomacy. These 
attributes are important because the success of coercive diplomacy relies upon the ability 
of leaders to correctly read their opponent's political and military reactions to their own 
government's actions and demands. The level of control or lack of control, that a leader 
has over his military and diplomats may be a crucial piece in the coercive diplomacy 
process. 
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The sixth condition is adequate domestic and international support. U.S. 
leaders must have a certain level of domestic support in order to exercise a strategy of 
coercive diplomacy. The extent of support required would vary with each specific 
incident, but it is quite likely that this level of support will be strongly dependent upon 
whether or not our interests are directly or indirectly threatened. 
While most countries would happily accept international support in a 
coercive diplomacy strategy, it is not a pre-requisite. Many countries would not be able 
implement the strategy unilaterally because of the great pressure that would be exerted 
upon them by the international community as well as the significant monetary cost they 
would be facing. But if a country believes strongly enough in its position and has the 
wherewithal to implement the strategy, it can do so alone. 
The seventh condition is unacceptability of threatened escalation. This 
condition plays upon the perceptions of the opponent's leadership and their fear that the 
crisis will escalate to an unacceptable level. The opponent will feel the impact of the 
coercive diplomacy on a more significant scale if the first actions and communications 
directed at him increase his fear that the crisis is escalating to a level, which provides for 
more severe circumstances than those promised by giving in to the coercing power's 
demands. 
The final condition is clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of 
the crisis. In some instances it is not enough for the coercing power to clarify the 
objectives and demands. In certain situations the coercing power may have to provide the 
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opponent with the specific terms required for conflict termination so that both sides can 
agree on and establish procedures for carrying out the terms and verifying that they are 
being implemented. In instances where the coercing power is making extreme demands, 
where the end result presents more of a threat to the opponent's interests than the 
punishment being inflicted or threatened, this would not be a helpful strategy (George, 
1991, pp. 76-81 and 1994, pp. 279-286). 
Not all of these eight c_onditions are equally important all the time in 
determining whether or not coercive diplomacy is the right strategy to pursue. George 
believes that three of these conditions play a large role in influencing the outcome 
because they have a direct impact on the opponent's perceptiqn. "Thus, coercive 
diplomacy is facilitated if the opponent believes that an asymmetry of motivation 
operates in favor of the coercing power, that it is time urgent to respond to the coercing 
power's demands, and that the coercing power will engage in escalation that would 
impose unacceptable costs". He also believes that a fourth condition, clarity of settlement 
terms, plays a key role in the success of coercive diplomacy (George, 1994, p. 287). 
3. Military Coercion 
While coercive diplomacy is primarily a defensive strategy, which offers an 
alternative to the reliance upon military action in an effort to change the status quo, 
military coercion relies upon the use of military instruments as a means to change the 
status quo, or alter an opponents behavior (Pape, 1992, p. 425). 
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Pape believes that the study of military coercion is important because states have 
used military force to persuade other states to do there bidding for many years. He also 
believes that it may be more relevant now than it was in the past. The fall of the former 
Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, the rise of regional powers, and the decline of the 
U.S. defense budget are all shifting national security policy away from deterring 
predictable threats toward responding to unpredictable threats once they strike (Pape, 
1996, pp. 1-2). 
a) Strategies for Military Coercion 
Pape describes four primary categories of military coercion as denial, 
punishment, risk, and decapitation. 30 
The first category of military coercion is a· denial strategy. Coercion by 
denial, which is Pape's preferred strategy, focuses on reducing the probability that 
resistance will yield benefits. It does this by discouraging an opponent from attacking by 
convincing him that he cannot attain his military or political goals with the use of force, 
or that the costs for attaining these goals will be too high. This strategy works by 
focusing on the opponent's military forces, their ability to manufacture arms, the 
interdiction of supplies to the battlefield, and the disruption of movement and 
communications on the battlefield (Pape, 1994, pp. 441-444 and 1996, pp. 13, 19, and 
69). 
30 See also, Warden, "The Enemy as a System'', Airpower Journal (Spring 1995), v 9, no 
1, pp. 40-55. 
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The second category of military coercion is a punishment strategy. 
Coercion by punishment attempts to raise the costs of continued resistance. It does this 
by discouraging an opponent from attacking by threatening to destroy and or take away 
what the opponent values the most. One of the primary ways that this would be 
accomplished is by threatening large civilian population centers for destruction. This 
strategy can also focus upon a much broader set of targets such as the opponent's 
diplomatic contingent in a foreign country, economic interests, and its political structure. 
These targets of value may include the military forces in an attempt to exploit the 
casualty sensitivities of the opponent. The primary focus of this strategy is to inflict such 
great pain on the opponent that any benefits the country may attain are outweighed by the 
losses they will incur (Pape, 1994, pp. 437-439 and 1996, pp. 13, 18, and 59). 
The third category of military coercion is a risk strategy. Risk strategies 
attempt to raise the probability of the suffering of civilians, much like the punishment 
strategy in that the same targets are at risk. Where this strategy differs from punishment 
is that the goal is to inflict civilian costs gradually rather than in one dramatic strike. The 
key element of this strategy is to convince the opponent that significantly more severe 
attacks will occur if concessions are not made. The coercer must signal to the opponent 
that the decision whether or not to attack is contingent upon the opponent's behavior 
(Pape, 1994, pp. 439-441and1996, pp. 18-19, and 66-67).31 
31 See also, Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1966. 
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The final category of military coercion is a decapitation strategy. A 
strategy of decapitation purposely targets an opponent's key leadership as well as its 
communications facilities. But in order for this strategy to be successful, these two 
targets must be vital to the survival of the opponent, in that if they are destroyed the 
opponent will fail no matter how strong their military or industrial might may be. Pape 
goes on to list three variants of decapitation strategy that may be attempted. 
The first strategy is l~adership decapitation, which attempts to kill 
specific leaders under the assumption that they are integral to the opponent's success. If 
these leaders are eliminated, peace is inevitable because there would be successors are not 
capable leaders, or they may fear for their own lives. 
The second strategy is political decapitation, which targets the opponent's 
instruments of internal control, such as, internal security forces and loyal military units, 
in an attempt to bring about an overthrow of the government. 
The final strategy is military decapitation, which focuses upon attacking 
the national command and communications networks in an attempt to isolate the primary 
leadership form its field units. With no way to communicate, these field units will not be 
able to coordinate with their neighboring units, and will be vulnerable to attack (Pape, 
1996,pp. 79-80).32 
32 For additional information on decapitation strategy, see Hebert, 1992; and Taylor, 
1999. 
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D. THE UTILITY OF DETERRENCE AND COERCION 
While most of today's literature on deterrence and coercion use scenarios that 
feature massed, modern conventional forces as the threat, we are aware that the end of the 
cold war and the break up of the former Soviet Union have brought about a need to revise 
these works. The primary threats we are faced with today tend ·to be regional powers at 
best, who are unable to challenge the U.S. on a symmetrical scale, and often times rely 
upon state-sponsored terrorism. So when we attempt to plug these unconventional 
opponents into the contemporary models of deterrence and coercion, it is not surprising 
that we do not fully understand these states or have a full understanding of how to deter 
or coerce them f:rom sponsoring terrorism. 
In concluding this chapter on deterrence and coercion, I would like ~o take this 
time to discuss the utility of these conventional theories on deterrence and coercion in 
their use against a state-sponsor of terrorism. In the concluding chapter I will make 
recommendations on how to make deterrent and coercive strategies more applicable in 
the fight against state-sponsored terrorism. 
1. Utility of Deterrence 
A deterrent strategy calls for having the ability to promptly deny an opponent's 
political and military objectives while also having the capability to punish the regime by 
inflicting great pain and suffering on the populace of the country, while also posing a 
threat to the regime's hold on power. As already discussed, state sponsors of terrorism · 
primarily use proxy terrorist groups to do their bidding, which allows the state in question 
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to hide behind this veil of terror. This makes it very difficult to attribute specific terrorist 
attacks to a particular state and subsequently target the state for retribution. But once a 
state is identified as a sponsor of terrorism, there are two strategies, which are the primary 
tools of deterrence, denial and punishment.33 
a) Denial 
A strategy of deterrence by denial, which is the preferred strategy to use 
according to Watman ~t al., appears to be a questionable strategy to use against a state-
sponsor of terrorism. It seems to be apparent that when up against a non-conventional 
opponent, such as a state-sponsor of terrorism, it would be difficult to implement a denial 
strategy because the state sponsor does not normally use its conventional military to 
conduct terrorist attacks. They typically rely on terrorist groups or a specific contingent 
of their security forces to do their bidding. Another reason why a conventional denial 
strategy would not work is because state sponsors are not typically interested in invading 
a neighbor and seizing territory when sanctioning these attacks. For this reason, it would 
be difficult to justify an attack on their conventional military. What are we trying to deny 
them from taking or doing? In this instance, an unconventional denial strategy aimed at 
the terrorist capabilities would be more appropriate and will be discussed in the last 
chapter. 
33 See also Snyder, 1959, pp. 1-7; Snyder, 1961, pp. 14-16; Mearsheimer, 1983; and 
Morgan, 1977. 
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It appears that a conventional denial strategy may have some merit if the 
goal of the deterring power is to see the sponsoring government overthrown. Most of 
these countries rely upon the military, in general and special security forces more 
specifically, to stay in power. By targeting these forces for destruction, we may be able 
to hasten the overthrow and replacement of the government in question. 
b) Punishment 
Deterrence by punishment, which plays upon the vulnerabilities of an 
opponent's civilian population or the regime's hold on power, appears to have more 
potential utility than a denial strategy, in the fight against state-sponsored terrorism. This 
argument seems to have the most utility when the regime's hold on power is threatened, 
because most regional powers value their hold on power over the welfare of their people. 
For this reason the civilian population of a state that sponsors terrorism would not be a 
wise choice to target. 
One of the primary problems we may face with targeting a state sponsor's 
hold on power is that it may make possible coalition partners and members of our own 
government uncomfortable. It goes to reason that if we target a government's hold on 
power, they will have nothing to lose, and will be extremely hard to deter. 
2. Utility of a Coercive Military Strategy 
A coercive strategy uses the threat of force or a limited exemplary use of force to 
persuade an opponent to stop an action before accomplishing a goal or to undo an action 
already begun. By using this strategy the coercing power is able to retain a great deal of 
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flexibility because the strategy relies upon deterrence, coercive diplomacy, as well as 
military coercion as tools in an effort to coerce an opponent. These different theories 
give the coercing power the ability to use responses which are normally attributed to 
cases of war, such as strategic bombing in military coercion; as well as possibly using 
responses on the opposite end of the spectrum, which are normally attributed to non-war 
cases such as sanctions in coercive diplomacy. 
a) Coercive Diplomacy 
While coercive diplomacy is primarily thought of as a peacetime, 
defensive strategy, it offers the coercing power the flexibility to threaten and or use a 
myriad of threats ranging from sanctions to an appropriate level of military force. This 
flexibility allows planners to use this strategy during times of war as well as during times 
of peace. The one thing that I most like about coercive diplomacy is that it is flexible 
enough to be used early, long before the need for the military, or after the military has 
been used and the state has stopped sponsoring terrorism. In either situation coercive 
diplomacy is an acceptable way to get the attention of the state-sponsor. 
h) Military Coercion 
Military coercion appears to be a less flexible strategy to be used in the 
battle against state-sponsored terrorism. Rather than allowing for responses along the 
entire spectrum of confliCt, military coercion relies upon the instruments of military 
power to carry out its strategy. When Pape discusses using this strategy, he is doing so in 
a wartime environment, which is much different from the one we would be facing in most 
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instances dealing with a state-sponsor of terrorism. But in the event the state were to 
sponsor repeated terrorist attacks, or one so egregious that a response must be initiated, 
the four tools of military coercion once again are denial, punishment, risk, and 
decapitation. 
A strategy of coercion by denial, which is the strategy of choice for Pape, 
does not appear to be any better choice of a strategy against a state sponsor of terrorism 
than a strategy of deterrence by denial. Although in this case the state in question is 
already sponsoring terrorist incidents, it will be just as hard to implement a denial 
strategy in this situation as it would be in a deterrent situation. Because the state typically 
rel~es upon terrorist groups or special security forces to do their bidding, it would be 
difficult to implement a denial strategy and target the state's military. 
A strategy of coercion by punishment, which also plays upon the 
vulnerabilities of an opponent's civilian population or the regime's hold on power, may 
also merit more consideration than a coercion by denial strategy. Just as in the case of 
deterrence by punishment, this argument will be strongest when the regime's hold on 
power is most threatened. 
A risk strategy provides more flexibility to the coercing power in that 
instead of inflicting all of the damage in one swift campaign, as in the punishment 
strategy, it inflicts the damage incrementally in an attempt to convince the opponent that 
more severe damage will follow. 
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One of the drawbacks to this campaign is that when directed against the 
regime it would not be swift enough or powerful enough to inflict the desired amount of 
damage to bring about the change in the government. In most cases states have the 
ability to repair or replace the things that we damage in these gradual attacks. They may 
look at the gradual attacks as a weakness in the attacking nations military or as a sign that 
the nation's government is not fully behind the attacks. The only instance where this 
would not be the case is in a state that does not have the ability to repair or replace 
damaged things, ·such as Iraq in the early 1990s, and quite likely North Korea today. 
By directly targeting the political and military leadership, the instruments 
of control, and the communications facilities designated for their use, the coercing power 
is attempting to put an end to the conflict in a relatively short time while also trying to 
avoid collateral damage. As I have already mentioned earlier, there is a possibility that 
this strategy will bring unintended consequences with it. 
In figure 4-1 I have attempted to depict how different coercive strategies, 
including Pape's, may affect George's three types of coercive diplomacy in an effort to 
get a state sponsor to change its behavior. The plus signs are positive indicators where I 
beli~we this strategy would be a good choice and produce positive results. The minus 
signs are negative indicators where I believe the strategy would be a bad choice or would 
have little affect on changing the behavior of a state-sponsor of terrorism. It appears that 
denial, punishment, and decapitation strategies that go after the security forces or the 
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leadership may have some merit, as well as a risk strategy that gradually increases the 
level and type of punishment. 
E. SUMMARY 
Of the two theories discussed in this chapter, it appears that coercion is better 
suited than deterrence in the ·battle against state-sponsored terrorism. This idea runs 
counter to classic deterrence and coercion theory, which states that coercion, will always 
be harder than deterrence to make work. Scott Sagan writes, 
A state making a commitment to deterrence places the burden of choice on 
a potential aggressor, who has the last clear chance to avoid conflict by 
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choosing to refrain from an attack. Compellence, in contrast, usually 
involves initiating an action ... the overt act, the first step, is up to the side 
that makes the compellent threat (1994, p. 84). 
I believe that this chapter demonstrates the difficulty a state would have in 
deterring a state-sponsor of terrorism, while also demonstrating the flexibility that 
coercive strategies would provide states in an attempt to coerce a state-sponsor of 
terrorism. 
The primary reason why I feel this way has to do with the definitions of 
deterrence and coercion. In deterrence we use the threat of force to prevent an adversary 
from doing something that we do not want him to do. We are able to carry out the 
thr~atened retaliation through the use of denial and or punishment, which call for 
targeting the population, infrastructure,· or leadership. The effectiveness of this threat 
relies upon the abilitY of our leadership to convey to the potential foe that we have the 
will and ability to retaliate if the foe commits the action. 
I believe that deterring a state sponsor of terrorism is more difficult for the 
following reasons. First, some of the most important aspects of deterrence, such as 
balance of military forces, lead us to deploy some of our forces· forward. While this may 
go a long way in deterring conventional forces, it also serves as another reason to target 
the U.S. while also providing the terrorists with easily accessible targets. Second, our 
engagement strategy leaves us with too many interests to protect and too many states that 
are threatening them to pose a credible threat to all of the states involved. Instead of 
posing a credible threat, we come off looking soft, an easy target. Finally, as far as 
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semantics go, we have already failed in deterring state-sponsored terrorism with our 
current deterrent strategy. 
In coercion we use the threat of force in an attempt to stop an adversary from 
doing something that he has already undertaken. In an effort to get an adversary to stop 
its actions, the state has more flexibility in that it can use military (denial, punishment, 
etc.) or non-military means (sanctions) to inflict pain on the foe. In coercion, the targets 
of the pain are still the population, infrastructure, leaders, etc., but they no longer have to 
be targeted with military force. Just as in the case of deterrence, the coercive threat also 
relies upon the ability of our leaders to convey to a potential foe that we have the will and 
the ability to strike, but now we will continue until he stops the undesirable action. 
Although coercion has not been successful in bri~ging about a complete end to 
state-sponsored terrorism, I have three primary reasons why I feel that it can be effective 
in the battle against terror. First, the shrinking defense budget and the number of 
sponsors to deter make deterrence an unrealistic goal. Because we cannot keep all of the 
states that have the means to sponsor terrorism from doing so, we should at least have the 
means to make them stop. Second, coercion does not rely totally upon military force to 
inflict the pain or punishment. This allows for greater flexibility in response options 
while also causing less collateral damage. And finally, I believe that a responsive and 
determined strategy of coercion can act, as a credible "general deterrent" threat against 
would be sponsors of terrorism. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, 
our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution. We hear it said that we live in an 
era of a limit to our powers. Well, let it also be understood, there are limits to our 
patience. 
President Ronald Reagan (January 1981)34 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In terms of the level of violence and publicity per terrorist attack, two of the most 
heavily targeted states are the· United States and Israel. Alexander (1999) claims that the 
U.S. has been the most popular target of terrorist attacks by state-sponsored groups (e.g., 
Libya, Iraq, and Iran) as well as substate groups (e.g., Hezbollah and Abu Nidal) from the 
1970s until the present. The Israelis, on the other hand, have been continually threatened 
since the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which gave the Jews the right to establish a 
national home (Alon, 1980, p. 8). Today, the Israelis are faced with many of the same 
threats. The primary difference now is that many of the states that once actively fought 
Israel now rely on terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Islamic Jihad to 
fjght for them (Beres, 1998, p. 60). 
Historically states have reacted to acts of state-sponsored terrorism only after a 
"smoking gun" has been produced. In a majority of the cases states have imposed 
sanctions of some sort unless the act was extremely egregious or the evidence irrefutable. 
34 This passage was part of a speech, given by President Reagan seven days after his 
inauguration, in which he welcomed the American hostages home from Iran as cited in 
Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origin of the US. Attack on Libya (New York: 
Praeger, 1990), p. 57. 
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There have only been a small number of cases where a state has used its military to strike 
back at an alleged state-sponsor of terrorism as a means to deter further attacks or coerce 
a state to cease its sponsorship. Some of the states that have documented instances where 
they have used their military in such a manner, are the U.S., Israel, France, and Great 
Britain.35 Of these countries, I have decided to examine cases of U.S. and Israeli efforts 
to counter state-sponsored terrorism. 
Of the two countries, the U.S. ~as had far fewer instances where it has used its 
military in response to a perceived state-sponsored terrorist attack. Although targeted 
frequently, the survival of the U.S. has never been threatened by terrorism. For this 
reason the U.S. has more choice about whether to respond to terrorist attacks. The ability 
to choose whether to respond forcefully can be attributed to a number· of things, such as 
how our government is set up, our military doctrine, and the proximity of our country to 
the countries that are sponsoring the attacks. 
The Israelis on the other hand, are more severely threatened by state-sponsored 
terrorism because they live with its affects on a daily basis. In the life-and-death struggle 
to remain a country, they use their military in combat on a much more regular basis than 
the United States. They do not have the same options as the U.S., which can more easily 
pick and choose when and where it will use military force. The proximity of Israel's 
35 For a brief synopsis of British and French CT strategies see Lesser, "Implications For 
Strategy", in Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, Countering the New 
Terrorism (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1999), pp. 115-120. 
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enemies, and the make-up of their government and military has conditioned Israel to 
retaliate on very short notice. 
The three cases to be discussed in this chapter consist of two U.S. examples and 
one extended Israeli example of forceful responses to state-sponsored terrorism. In the 
first study, we will examine the 1986 airstrikes in response to ·perceived Libyan state-
sponsored terrorism. The second case is really a series of Israeli responses to state-
sponsored terrorism by states such as Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, from the creation of the 
Israeli State in 1948 to the 1982 conflict in Lebanon. The final case examines the 1998 
cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan, which reportedly provided some 
sort of sponsorship to the Osama Bin Ladin terrorist network. 
B. OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON 
Operation El Dorado Canyon, the U.S. military reprisal for Libyan state-
sponsored terrorism, is an important case to study because it was the first time in modem 
history that the U.S. military was ever used to counter state-sponsored terrorism. The 
operation was intended to. effect a coercive strategy against Libyan state-sponsored 
terrorism, as well as a deterrent strategy against international terrorism in general. 
Another goal of the operation was to demonstrate to the world that state-sponsored 
terrorism could be countered, and that the U.S. was willing to take the lead in doing so. 
Whether the operation had the intended effect is still debated today. However, the 
operation did have some initial effect on Libyan-sponsored terrorism as well as 
international terrorism, and these effects will be examined here. 
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1. Background 
Colonel Muammar al-Qadaffi became the leader of Libya on September 1, 1969, 
when he led a coup that overthrew King Idris. Although the U.S. was apprehensive about 
supporting the new leader, it was more concerned with the spread of communism in the 
Arab world, and recognized the new government almost immediately. Later, as the U.S. 
tried to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East, and provided increasing 
support to Israel, U.S.-Libyan relations began to suffer in the early 1970s. 
Another reason U.S.-Libyan relations cooled was because of Qaddafi's 
involvement in terrorism, almost from the beginning. Although Qaddafi started slowly, 
the extent of Libyan support continued to increase throughout the 1970s, and reached its 
peak in the 1980s. He first supported the terrorist groups Fatah and the Popular Front of 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1969. He later assisted the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) in the early 1970s while also setting up terrorist training facilities in Libya. Davis 
explains that during the 1980s it was estimated that Libya trained as many as seven to 
eight thousand terrorists and guerrillas a year; spent approximately $100 million on arms 
and monetary disbursements to Palestinian terrorists; provided rent free offices, 
headquarters, and villas in Libya; shared intelligence with terrorist groups; provided 
transport aboard Libyan airliners; provided false passports; and provided safe havens for 
terrorists operating in Europe. The only country that surpassed Libya in providing 
financial support to terrorists in the mid-and late 1980s, was Iran (Davis, 1990, pp. 10-
11 ). 
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It was also during the 1980s that Qaddafi became one of the primary problems 
that the Reagan administration sought to resolve. It was not until 1985, According to 
Zimmerman, that "the growing problem of international terrorism (much of it directed at 
U.S. interests), and Qaddafi's persistent and public involvement with that terrorism, 
moved the Reagan administration to sharply focus its policies with regard to Libya" 
(1994, p. 201). 
2. Chronology of Libyan-Sponsored Terrorist Attacks 
The following chronology of Libyan-sponsored terrorism will briefly describe 
each terrorist incident that the United States was able to attribute to Libya from 1980 to 
1990. Besides the date and country that the incident occurred in, the chronology breaks 
down the incidents into three categories. First are the attacks that involve direct 
involvement by Libya, which are often times referred to as "state terror" incidents. These 
are depicted by an (L). Second are the attacks against U.S. citizens, property, or interests. 
These are depicted by a (US). And finally are the attacks that appear to be Libyan 












Description of Event 
Tunisian and French Embassies attacked. Libyans do 
nothing. 
Libyan lawyer killed in London. 
Libyan businessman killed. Killer implicated Qadaffi. 
Anti-Libyan journalist killed. 
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1980 May Italy(L) Libyan exile killed in Rome. 
W. Ger.(L) Libyan exile killed in Bonn. 
Italy(L) Libyan businessman killed in Rome. 
Greece(L) Libyan exile killed in Athens. 
Italy(L) Libyan exile shot at in Rome, but survives. Captured 
gunman says he was sent by Libya "to kill an enemy of 
the people". 
Jun. Italy(L) Anti-Qadaffi Libyan exile wounded in Rome. 
Italy(L) Libyan exile killed in Milan. 
Oct. Gambia(L) Libyan subversion in Gambia, details unknown. 
Nov. UK(L) Ant-Qadaffi Libyan student killed in London. 
1981 Feb. Italy(L) Libyan gunman shoots at travelers in Rome ai;rport with 
no fatalities. Target was anti-Qadaffi exile. 
Jun. Sudan Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in 
Khartoum. 
Jul. U.S.(L) Anti-Qadaffi Libyan student killed in Utah. 
Oct. Egypt Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from 
Libyan plane, via Malta, no casualties. 
Sudan Attempted assassination of Chadian official thwarted. 
Nov. Sudan Several bombs explode near government installations in 
Khartoum. 
1982 No reported incidents identified. 
1983 No incidents that fit my definition of state-sponsored terrorism. 
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1984 Mar. UK(L) Four bombs explode near homes of Libyan exiles, while 
three others are defused. 25 are injured and nine 
Libyan suspects are arrested. 
Apr. UK(L) British citizen killed and 11 anti-Qaddafi demonstrators 
wounded by Libyan agents. 
Libya(L) British suspects arrested and held hostage in response to 
closure of Libyan Embassy in London. Hostages are 
initially released unharmed. 
UK Bomb likely from a Libyan airliner explodes and injures 
25. 
Jun. Greece(L) Anti-Qaddafi Libyan shop owner shot by an employee of 
Libyan Arab Airlines. 
Greece(L) Anti-Qaddafi Libyan editor of Arab Newspaper killed. 
Greece(L) Two Libyan students brutally killed. 
Aug_. Belgium Bomb explodes in office of Air Zaire. 
B¥lgium Bomb explodes in front of Zairian Embassy. 
UK(L) Libyan awaiting trial for April 1984 bombing is found 
shot in London home. 
Sep. Chad Plot to assassinate President foiled. 
ltaly(L) Libyan exile killed. 
Nov. Egypt Plot to assassinate Prime Minister foiled. 
1985 Feb. Austria(L) Former Libyan Ambassador wounded in drive-by 
shooting. 
Mar. Italy(L) Libyan jeweler killed. 
Apr. Cyprus(L) Libyan businessman killed in Nicosia. 
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1985 W. Ger.(L) Moroccan citizen killed by Libyan gunman. 
W. Ger.(L) Anti-Qaddafi Libyan student killed by Libyan gunman. 
Sep. Tunisia(L) Libyan diplomat smuggled 100 letter bombs and mails 
them causing injury to two postal workers. 
Oct. Greece(L) Libyan merchant wounded by two gunmen. 
Dec. Malta Hijacked Egyptian airliner may have received support 
from Libya. 
1986 Feb. Italy(L) Owner ?f anti-Qaddafi radio station wounded in Rome 
by two suspected Libyan agents. 
Apr. W.Ger. Labelle disco bombing kills 2 Americans. 
(US) 
Sudan* US Embassy communications offi~er shot in Khartoum. 
(US)(L) Evidence points to Libyan agents. 
Lebanon* Two British and an American hostages murdered. 
(US)(L) British link the killings to Libya. 
Turkey* Two Libyans with hand grenades arrested in an attempt 
(US)(L) to attack US officer's club. Admit getting grenades from 
Libyan Embassy. 
N.Yemen* US Embassy communications officer injured in Sanaa. 
(US) Attack believed to be instigated by Libya. 
May Indo.* JRA car bomb explodes outside Canadian Embassy and 
(US) rocket attack launched against US and Japanese 
Embassies. 
Jun. France(L) Libyan industrialist killed in Paris suburb by suspected 
Libyan agents. 
Jul. Togo Plan to attack US Embassy is thwarted. Individuals 
(US) captured confess to having received arms from Libyan 
Embassy. 
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1986 Aug. Cyprus* 
Sep. Pak.* 
(US) 














1988 Feb. Senegal 
Mortar and rocket attack conducted on UK base. 
Believed to be retaliatory hit for UK support in 1986 
strike. 
Pan Am jet hijacked. Twenty-one killed to include two 
Americans. Evidence points to Libyan involvement. 
Libyan anti-Qadaffi businessman killed by suspected 
assassins. 
Government building attacked. 
Cafe Historil bombed. 
Two Libyan supported terrorists wound two British 
citizens. 
Attempted assassination of anti-Qaddafi activist and 
former Libyan Ambassador. Gunman had a Libyan 
passport and fled to Libyan Embassy. 
Three US Embassy employees wounded. 
US Embassy compound attacked with crude missiles. 
Anti-Qaddafi Libyan activist killed in Rome by two 
Libyan agents. 
World Vision is bombed. 
Two French gendarmes assassinated. 
UK officials intercept a 150 ton Libyan arms shipment 
to the PIRA in Ireland, while others are missed. 
Libyan terrorists arrested while smuggling arms. 
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1988 Apr. US* JRA member arrested with three bombs in car. Likely 
intended for an attack on the air raid anniversary. 
Spain* USAF communications facility bombed on the 
anniversary of the air raid. 
Costa US-Costa Rica center attacked near the anniversary of 
Rica*(US) the air raid. 
Peru* (US) US-Peru center attacked near the anniversary of the 
air raid. 
Colombia* US-Colombia center attacked near the anniversary of the 
(US) air raid. 
Italy* (US) JRA car bomb in Naples kills five,Including US 
servicemember at the time of the anniversary of the air 
raid. 
May Cyprus Car bomb prematurely detonated near Israeli Embassy in 
Nicosia. 
Sudan Hotel in Khartoum attacked with bombs and machine-
guns. 
Jul. Greece Cruise ship attacked. Nine killed and nearly 100 injured. 
Arms used had been sold in Libya. 
Dec. UK* (US) Pan Am 103 bombed. 259 killed, including 189 
Americans. 
1989 Apr. Costa US-Costa Rica center attacked again. 
Rica*(US) 
Sep. Niger UTA Flight 772 bombed. 171 French citizens are killed. 
France concludes Libya masterminded operations. 
1990 Mar. Ethiopia Unsuccessful bomb attack on Israeli Ambassador. 
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1990 May Haiti (US) Attack against US Embassy thwarted. Libya provided 
$20k to Haitian group. 
Source: "Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism: A Dilemma For Policymakers'', 1986, pp. 67-70; 
and Voigt, Responses to Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism (1980-1994): A Comparative 
Analysis (Monterey, Ca.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), pp. 7-15. 
3. U.S. Responses to Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism 
In response to an increase in anti-U.S. rhetoric by Qadaffi, the U.S. began to 
change its Libyan policy gradually in the early 1970s, from support to opposition. As 
Libyan rhetoric was replaced by terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, property, and 
interests, the U.S. took an increasingly tougher stance in its responses to the attacks. The 
following chronology depicts some of the major U.S. responses to Libyan-sponsored 
terrorism from 1973-1986. 
Chronology of U.S. Responses 
Year Description of U.S. Event Directed at Libya 
1973 US-Libya relations deteriorate and US changes policy of conciliation to policy 
of low-priority opposition. 
US blocks the transfer of eight C-130 aircraft to Libya, even though they are 
already paid for. 
1976 Egypt plans to attack Libya and the US makes a commitment to deter a Soviet 
intervention on the Libyan side. 
1978 US State Department blocks the export of additional items to Libya. 
1979 US State Department blocks the export of 7 4 7 aircraft to Libya. 
Libya is placed on the US State Department list of state-sponsors of terrorism. 
1980 US aids Tunisia against Libyan backed guerrillas. 
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1980 April, Carter administration expels six Libyan diplomats. 
May, US withdraws remaining representatives from Tripoli and closes its 
Embassy. 
1981 US policy towards Libya takes a more aggressive approach and its openly 
professed goal is to bring about a change in Qadaffi's behavior. 
Remaining Libyan diplomats are expelled and their Embassy is closed. 
US increased aid to countries wishing to resist Libyan intervention. 
1982 US begins to support Libyan exiles openly. 
August, US Sixth Fleet carries out maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, in an area 
that Libya claims to be within its national waters. 
November, US and Arab allies conduct operation Bright Star along Egypt-Libya 
border. 
December, President Reagan calls for all Americans to leave Libya. 
1983 US launches a unilateral trade embargo against Libya. 
US sends monetary and military aid to Chad in its fight against Libya. US also 
dispatches military forces to the region to include two carriers, eight F-15s and 
two AWACS. 
1984 US attempts to get Europe to honor and take part in sanctions against Libya with 
little affect. 
1985 After Achille Lauro incident, President Reagan authorizes covert CIA assistance 
to Libyan exile organizations. 
After Rome and Vienna massacres, US gives Israel the green light to retaliate 
for the killings and reiterates its right to respond with military force. 
1986 President Reagan calls for all Americans to leave Libya and announces 
increased sanctions. 
US assists Chad once again with monetary and military aid against Libya. 
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1986 US again conducts maneuvers in the Gulf of Sidra, in Operation Prairie Fire, 
hoping for a military confrontation with Libya. 
14 April, In response to Labelle Discotheque bombings by Libyan agents, the 
US retaliates with airstrikes against Libya in Operation El Dorado Canyon. 
Source: Davis, 1990, pp. 33-126 
4. U.S. Coercive Diplomacy against Libya: December 1985, to April 1986 
In Janu~ 1986, the Reagan administration took its first formal steps towards 
taking a tougher stance against Libya· by adopting a "comprehensive and· intensive 
strategy" of coercive diplomacy. The public goal of the policy was to persuade Qadaffi 
to end his state-sponsorship of terrorism through the use of diplomatic, economic, and 
military means (Zimmerman, p. 201 ). By openly calling for Qadaffi to end his 
sponsorship of terrorism, the U.S. government was pursuing the easiest type of coercive 
diplomacy, Type A. 
Prior to arriving at this point, the administration had been split amongst members 
that called for immediate retaliation against Libya, and the other group that wanted to 
give peaceful means such as sanctions a longer opportunity to work. 
Zimmerman describes in detail why the choice was made to adopt Alexander 
George's "Try- and-See Approach" versus a more aggressive option. First, the Secretary 
of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Pentagon were against any quick military action. 
They were also concerned about finding and striking targets that had something to do 
with terrorism if the President called for a strike. Second, Secretary Weinberger argued 
that there were too many Americans in Libya that could have been harmed by collateral 
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damage or through retaliation by Qaddafi. Third, he argued that all of the political and 
economic sanctions had not been fully completed, and should be given a longer time to 
work. Fourth, if force were to be used, Weinberger wanted the force to be overwhelming. 
In order for this to occur detailed planning and the movement of another aircraft carrier to 
the region were required. And finally, more time was required to win the support of our 
allies against Libya and its support of state-sponsored terrorism (Zimmerman, pp. 205-
206). 
a) The Try-and-See Strategy 
Instead of opting for immediate military strikes after the December 27, 
1985 terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, President Reagan decided to 
adopt a gradual try-and-see strategy, which is a variant of the ultimatum that only places a 
demand on the opponent.36 In doing so he called for increased economic pressure while 
also calling for the military planners to continue with contingency planning in case this 
approach did not work, or if another Libyan sponsored attack occurred. 
In an attempt to follow the try-and-see strategy of this period of the crisis, 
I will follow the Zimmerman model and divide the strategy into three phases. 
In the first phase, where peaceful pressure was applied from 27 December 
27, 1985, until January 23, 1986, the primary goal of the try-and-see strategy was to 
apply additional political and economic pressure on Libya and Qaddafi. This was to be 
36 See also, George, 1991, pp. 7-9 and 1994, pp. 18-19. 
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accomplished by expanding the restrictions, which had been employed in 1982, and by 
also encouraging our European allies to participate and honor the campaign against 
Qaddafi. 
On January 7, the President increased the sanctions to include a total ban 
on direct import and export trade with Libya, except for humanitarian purposes. He also 
asked all U.S. citizens to leave Libya by February 151 or face the possibility of having 
criminal charges waiting for them upon their return. Unfortunately, the Europeans did 
not support the sanctions as well as the administration had hoped for while a number of 
U.S. citizens chose to ignore the President's request to leave the country. 
Instead of bringing about any moderation of Qaddafi's policies, these 
measures only served to provoke him further. He openly challenged the U.S. military, 
condoned the Rome and Vienna attacks, and also called for an increase in terrorist 
missions. It was quite apparent that peaceful pressure was not going to work and that 
more aggressive measures were required (Zimmerman, 207-209). 
In the second phase, where a show of force lasted from January 23, 1986, 
until March 14, 1986, the primary goals of the try-and-see strategy were first, to 
demonstrate the resolve of the U.S. to Qadaffi and the Soviets by conducting show of 
force operations. The second goal was to warn U.S. allies that if they did not apply stiffer 
sanctions against Libya, the U.S. could possibly initiate unilateral military operations 
against Libya. The third goal was to demonstrate to other states in the region that the 
U.S. had lost its patience with state-sponsored terrorism and was prepared to strike back 
105 
with military force. And finally, the U.S. wanted to test and wear down the Libyan 
command and control defenses as well as their antiaircraft defenses. 
The U.S. conducted this phase of the strategy by carrying out freedom of 
navigation exercises in the Gulf of Sidra which included sending ships and planes across 
the so-called Libyan "line of death".37 Although the operations did not change Qaddafi's 
behavior, they did serve a purpose in that they demonstrated a greater level ofresolve and 
commitment to the Europeans and Qaddafi. 
Once again these measures did not modify Qaddafi's behavior, and may 
have in fact provoked him further. Qaddafi's reply to this increased military pressure was 
to . threaten war in the Mediterranean while also increasing surveillance on U.S. 
diplomats. President Reagan made a determination that Qadaffi "was not getting the 
message" and decided to raise the stakes even higher. (Zimmerman, pp. 209-211). 
Finally, in the third phase, where the use of force was the primary theme 
from March 14, 1986, until the April 14, 1986 bombing raid, the primary goal or hope of 
the try-and-see strategy was to provoke a military clash with Qaddafi. This goal was in 
fact realized on 24 and 25 March during a number of limited 'naval engagements in the 
Gulf of Sidra. · However, once the idea of U.S. freedom of navigation was established, a 
37 See Davis, p. 89, where he describes that on January 25, 1986, Qaddafi made a staged 
appearance before Western media personnel, where he boarded a Libyan patrol boat to 
sail into the Gulf of Sidra for a confrontation with the U.S. Sixth Fleet and pronounce that 
the parallel 32'30" north latitude to be the "line of death where we shall stand and fight 
with our backs to the wall". 
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combination of pressure from members of Congress and foreign leaders forced the 
withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet from the Gulf of Sidra to north of the "line of death". 
Despite the poor showing of his military, Qaddafi refused to change his 
behavior and stop sponsoring terrorist attacks. He openly called for terrorist attacks 
against Americans while also claiming "it is time for confrontation, for war. If they (the 
United States) want to expand the struggle, we will carry it out all over the world" 
(Zimmerman, p. 213). 
The U.S. did not have long to wait before Qaddafi finally presented an 
opportunity to retaliate, because on April 5, 1986, just three days later, four Americans 
were killed in a bombing. Qaddafi was involved in the bombing of the La Belle 
Dischotechue in West Berlin. The U.S. finally had irrefutable proof, which was also 
corroborated by other governments, that Qaddafi was involved in the deadly bombing 
(Davis, p. 116).38 The resulting air strikes hit five targets that were tied to Qaddafi's 
involvement in terrorism. These targets were selected in order to send a message to other 
sponsors of terrorism as well as terrorists in general, while also providing the basis for a 
legal attack in the eyes of the UN. 
While the air strikes proved to be the culminating point of President 
Reagan's try-and-see approach, he held no expectations that they would topple the 
Qaddafi regime or stop his sponsorship of terrorism. The one thing he did hope for was 
38 For additional information on the Labelle Discotheque bombing and the details leading 
up to the retaliatory bombing raids, see Davis, 1990, pp. 115-131. 
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that Qaddafi would remember the airstrikes and contemplate their high cost the next time 
he sponsored a terrorist attack. It is now generally known that it did not take long for 
Qaddafi to resume his support of state-sponsored terrorism. (Zimmerman, pp. 211-216). 
5. Evaluation of Operation El Dorado Canyon 
Even after all of these years there are still contrasting views as to the effectiveness 
of Operation El Dorado Canyon. Some of the primary reasons for this difference in 
opinion have to deal with how the people conducting the studies define terrorism and 
state-sponsored terrorism. This directly affects what incidents are labeled as state-
sponsored incidents as well as international terrorist incidents. 
In this _instance the literature reveals that Operation El Dorado Canyon 
demonstrated some deterrent as well as coercive effect. What is not clear is how long 
these effects lasted. In an effort to discuss the merits of the operation, I will assess the 
positive and negative aspects of the operation. 
a) Positive Aspects 
One of the most positive results of the operation is that the airstrikes 
caused a great deal of physical destruction to some of the facilities that were affiliated 
with Qaddafi's support for terrorism. We demonstrated a great deal of resolve while also 
making the airstrikes personally directed at Qadaffi and his terrorism machine. One other 
positive aspect in targeting military targets is that the airstrikes assisted in increasing the 
level of unrest and dissent in the Libyan military while also decreasing Qaddafi's level of 
popular support in the months following the raid. 
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In what were perhaps the two most significant achievements, the air strike 
caused Soviet-Libyan relations to become strained to a point from which they never 
recovered. They also served as a wake up call to the U.S. European allies by 
demonstrating that the U.S. was willing to take a unilateral stand against Libya and state-
sponsored terrorism. Shortly after the air strikes, a number of European countries 
adopted stronger political and economic sanctions against Libya, finally heeding the U.S. 
request to ?o so. 
In a different study of Operation El Dorado Canyon, Prunckun and Mohr 
come up with a slightly different conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the airstrikes. 
They claim that, " ... the immediate probable aims of the U.S. raid on Tripoli-namely, 
limiting the actions of Libyan-associated groups and reducing the incidence of terrorist 
actions against U.S. targets-were achieved". They go on to say that the data also 
suggests that the airstrikes influenced the nature of worldwide terrorist activity (p. 278). 
They make these claims by showing that of the fifteen groups reputed to 
have the strongest links to Libya, nine were active during the forty-one-month period 
studied.39 Figure 5-1 lists the nine groups and the number of terrorist incidents attributed 
to each group before and after the raid. With the exception of the Fatah Revolutionary 
Council, the remainder of the groups took part in far fewer terrorist attacks after the raid 
(Prunckun and Mohr, pp. 272-274). 
39 The period of the study covered a forty-one-month period, with the focus being on 
twenty and a half months before and after the April 14, 1986, airstrike. 
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h) Negative Aspects 
One of the largest post-raid disappointments is that this operation did not 
stop Libyan-sponsored terrorism. While the data supports the assertion that Qaddafi's 
support declined for a short time, it also appears that there was escalation in the level of 
violence per attack such as in the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UT A Flight 772. 
Zimmerman appears to be skeptical that Qaddafi significantly reduced his 
sponsorship because of the airstrikes. He introduces the possibility that Qaddafi's 
apparent reduction in terrorist support may have in fact been the result of a more 
clandestine Qaddafi, who may have been carrying on with his support at or near the same 
level as before. He also postulates that Qaddafi's actual or perceived level of support 
may have been intertwined with political developments such as his defeat in Chad. 
Whether the attack substantially decreased his level of support, Qadaffi still continued to 
support terrorism in defiance of U.S. demands (Zimmerman, pp. 216-219). 
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6. Conclusion 
As is the case in any study, it is difficult to make generalizations only with the 
data from one observation. Such is the instance of the strategy of coercive diplomacy in 
Operation El Dorado Canyon. While it would be difficult to draw any categorical 
conclusions about using coercive diplomacy against a state-sponsor of terrorism, 
Zimmerman does make some astute observations, which may assist in future applications. 
First, he brings out the point that allied cooperation, while not necessary, plays a 
key role in bringing to bear the full power of coercive diplomacy. In this instance the 
U.S. attempts at imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions against Libya were 
ineffective because our allies had different interests and did not join us in imposing 
sanctions on Libya. With no international cooperation, we were forced to impose 
unilateral sanctions, which did not have the strength to bring about change in Qaddafi's 
behavior by themselves. 
Another area where allied cooperation could have greatly increased the coercive 
effect of the operation was in military cooperation. In this instance, the only country that 
cooperated with the operation was Great Britain. By allowing U.S. Air Force bombers to 
be flown from Great Britain, the British allowed a great deal more firepower to be used in 
the operation. However, the lack of cooperation from a number of other countries by not 
allowing overflight of their countries, forced the flight times to be increased significantly 
and reduced the number of aircraft used. In this instance the U.S. was fortunate in that 
the location of Libya allowed the use of Navy carrier aircraft. In the future we may not 
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be so lucky, and may need the assistance of other countries in order to establish staging 
areas to attack from. 
Zimmerman's second point brings to light the difficulty of carrying out a strategy 
of coercive diplomacy that relies primarily upon military force to compel the opponent to 
change its behavior. The makeup of our government and military often times makes it 
difficult to form a united front that supports the use of military force. 
By relying solely upon military force to compel Qadaffi to change his behavior, 
and abandoning sanctions, the U.S. lost the initiative, in that it had to wait for him to 
sponsor another terrorist attack. We could not legally attack him without some sort of 
legitimate provocation. Qadaffi continued with his sponsorship, and the U.S. was 
justified in using military force in the retaliatory airstrikes. 
Reliance upon the military also brings to light the question of what to do if the 
sponsoring country continues its actions even after military action has been used. This 
was the case when Libya continued sponsoring terrorism after the· April airstrike. The 
United States eventually decided against additional military action for a number of 
reasons. First, Davis writes that it would be hard to come up with the proverbial 
"smoking gun" required for a retaliatory strike, on every occasion. And even if we did 
so, it would be difficult to support the military operations for any duration because of the 
great distance from home bases and ports (p. 170). Secondly, Zimmerman explains that 
the administration feared that the public and congress would not tolerate repeated uses of 
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the military. So they instead turned their focus to Psychological and covert operations (p. 
218). 
In a final analysis, Zimmerman writes that the coercive strategy had a few 
positives and a number of weaknesses. On the positive side the strategy was aided by the 
strong desire to confront Qadaffi publicly, the high level of public support, and the 
number of workable military options available to the planners. In the end this operation 
proved to the terrorists, sponsors, and our. allies that we were willing to take a stand 
against terrorism. 
The primary weaknesses that plagued the strategy included: the heavy reliance 
upon military force as the primary coercive instrument against Libya, the ability of 
Qadaffi to continue supporting terrorism while also reducing the possibility of incurring 
repeated military reprisals, and the difficulty in bringing the conflict to an acceptable end 
for the U.S. But in the end the fundamental weakness of this operation was that it was 
only a single strike, never followed up by any others (Zimmerman, pp. 219-222). 
C. ISRAELI RESPONSES TO STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 
Israel makes for an interesting case study because of the unique situation the 
Israelis find themselves in. Israel is surrounded by Arab countries that have all 
participated in attempts to destroy Israel at one time or another. 
In a testament to the tenacity of both sides, Israel still exists and the Arabs have 
not given up. The earliest Arab attempts to destroy Israel were through conventional 
military attacks. When these were unsuccessful, the Arabs eventually settled upon 
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terrorist attacks as the primary means to defeat .Israel. In response to these terrorist 
attacks, the Israeli response can be categorized as one of reaction and retaliation in an 
effort to deter further terrorist attacks. 
1. Background 
Since its creation in 1948, Israel has been involved in four major wars where it 
was attacked by its Arab neighbors, 1948 (War of Independence), 1967 (Six-Day War), 
1969 (War of Attrition), and 1973 (Yorn Kipper War); while also being involved in two 
other major wars when it took the offensive, in 1956 (The Sinai Campaign) and 1982 
(War in Lebanon). Even during times of relative peace, Israel still remains in a high state 
of readiness because of the continuous threat of conventional and terrorist attacks. 
Whatever era or areas the terrorist groups came from, their primary goals were to 
bring about the destruction of Israel. Groups such as the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), and its offspring, Fatah and Black September carried out the earliest 
terrorist attacks. The groups received much of their support from countries such as 
Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, and Syria. Today the primary threat comes from a number of 
Islamic fundamentalist organizations such as Hamas, Hizballah, and the Islamic Jihad. 
These groups receive a great deal of support from states such as Iran, Libya, and Syria, 
while also receiving support from non-state actors such as the PLO, a one time terrorist 
organization itself. 
Memories of the Holocaust, as well as the ever-present threat of attack by its 
neighboring Arab States are constant reminders that keep the Israelis ever vigilant. For 
114 
these reasons, the protection of their homeland is the most important issue, and the people 
oflsrael are not willing to compromise on any threat to their security. 
Israel's experience in having to deal with such a large number of terrorist 
incidents has provided the country with a framework upon which to base responses to 
terrorist attacks. These responses are founded on the principles of deterrence, 
preemption, prevention, and reprisals. In order to carry out the responses to terrorist 
attacks, Israel relies upon three agenci~s: the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), the Israeli 
National Police, and the Israeli intelligence community (Crenshaw and Pimlot, 1997, p. 
615). 
2. Israeli Countermeasures: 1948-1967 
Until the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel primarily focused on reprisal or retaliatory 
raids as its major counter to terrorist attacks. Members of the Palestinian Diaspora, which 
left Israel during the 1948 war, carried out the first acts of terrorism directed at the Israeli 
State. These refugees were encouraged to leave their safe havens in· Egypt and Jordan 
and primarily conducted attacks against Israeli civilians and various targets of strategic 
importance. 
Israel was not prepared to deal with such threats as border crossing terrorist raids. 
The primary concern of this new country was to prepare for a large-scale attack from the 
Arab states, which required a great deal of time and money. In response to the terrorist 
attacks, a special commando unit, Force 101, was quickly established. The Israeli 
commandos were primarily concerned with setting ambushes along the border while also 
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conducting retaliatory strikes into Arab states to destroy training camps and facilities. 
The intent of the strikes was to destroy the infrastructure of the Palestinian attackers 
while also inflicting collateral damage against the armed forces of the hosting Arab 
nations. 
Hanon Alon writes that "during the period of 1949-1956, 269 operations 
originated from the West Bank (Jordan) and 460 from Egypt. Two hundred sixty-four 
Israeli civilians were killed and 4 77 wounded in these operations" (1980, pp. 14-15). He 
also relates that from 1950-1955, the Israeli forces conducted 45 reprisal operations 
against Jordan and 18 reprisal operations against Egypt. Two hundred fifty-eight 
Jordanians were killed and 133 were injured, while 193 Egyptians were killed and 203 
were injured in these retaliatory operations (Anon, 1980, p._ 18).40 
Israeli retaliation played a large role in reducing the number of terrorist attacks in 
the occupied territories while also modifying the behavior of some Arab States. 
According to Schiff, Israel's retaliation policy was based upon the premise that the only 
way to deter Arabs was to act according to three rules. First, Arabs only understand and 
respect the language of force. -Second, when attacked Israel must retaliate. Not to do so 
would signal weakness and invite further attacks. And finally, a tit-for-tat policy of 
retaliation would not suffice. Israel must retaliate with twice the level of violence for 
every attack (1985, p. 79). This line of thinking eventually led Egypt, Jordan, and 
40 See also Schiff, A History of the Israeli Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1985), pp. 68-85. 
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Lebanon, who all provided safe haven at one time or another, to refuse to allow terrorist 
groups to base their attacks from their perspective territories out of fear of retaliatory 
attacks (Alon, 1980, pp. 12-20; and Crenshaw and Pimlott, 1997, pp. 615-617). 
The Israeli retaliation policy and the Sinai Campaign of 1956 brought nine years 
of relative peace to Israel. During this time there were few terrorist attacks conducted on 
Israeli soil. . However, in 1965 Yasser Arafat and the Fatah organization initiated new 
waves of terrorist attacks. These attacks were very similar to earlier ones and they also 
brought about the same type of Israeli retaliatory attacks. The terrorist attacks and 
retaliatory military strikes continued until 1967, when they were brought to a climax in 
the Six-Day War (Schiff, pp. 166-167). 
3. Israeli Countermeasures: 1967-1978 
Shortly after the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, the Arab World came 
to a conclusion that they would not be able to destroy Israel by conventional means, as 
victory allowed Israel to expand its borders and create a buffer zone against conventional 
military attacks. 
Two schools of thought emerged in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Six-
Day War. The first school came to terms with the fact that Israel could not be defeated 
conventionally, and decided that it should accept Israel as a state and make a formal 
peace. The second school of thought also recognized Israel's increased defensive 
strength, and that it could not be defeated within its new boundaries. However, it did feel 
that Israel could be destroyed if they could be forced back to the pre-1967 borders. They 
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sought an unconventional approach to force Israel back to its pre-1967 borders through 
the use of terrorism and diplomatic pressure (Netanyahu, 1995, pp. 99-101). 
The second school of thought quickly won support and terrorist attacks by the 
Palestinian Diaspora against Israel reached new highs. Alon attributes the increase in 
terrorist attacks to the following factors: first, once the realization was made that Israel 
could not be destroyed through conventional military means, the Arab world adopted 
terrorism as a means to keep the conflict alive. Many Arab countries such as Syria, 
Jordan, and Egypt, as well as a number of eastern bloc countries provided terrorist 
organizations with an ample amount of support. A number of Arab states also allowed 
the_se terrorist groups to use their countries as safe havens and staging areas for terrorist 
attacks. The second factor focused on the million plus Palestinians who were now under 
Israeli occupation. The terrorist organizations wasted little time in taking advantage of 
these willing insurgents. Third, competing terrorist organizations felt compelled to 
commit terrorist acts in an attempt to win support and justify their existence (Alon, 1980, 
pp. 41-45). 
One final outcome of the Six-Day War of 1967, was the War of Attrition where 
Egypt attempted to wear Israel down by striking at its defenses and inflicting heavy 
losses from 1969 to 1970. The genesis of this war can be traced back to a convention of 
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Arab states that convened in late 1967, which adopted a three point resolution of: no 
peace for Israel, no negotiation with Israel, and no recognition oflsrael (Schiff, p. 178).41 
In response to the cross-border raids by the Palestinian terrorists, Israel increased 
its defensive posture along the borders, while also increasing retaliatory airstrikes, 
commando raids, and artillery strikes against the countries harboring the terrorists. One 
of the countries hardest hit by the retaliatory strikes was Jordan. The Israelis purposely 
targeted Jordan because of the large number of terrorist operations that were originating 
within its borders. In an effort to bring an end to the Israeli retaliatory strikes and stop 
the increasing pressure the terrorists were putting on its government, the Jordanian 
military crushed .the Palestinian insurgents and forced them from their primary safe haven 
in 1970 (Schiff, pp. 171-177). 
While the Jordanian civil war brought an end to terrorist attacks being staged out 
of Jordan, the displaced Palestinians quickly settled in Lebanon, which became their new 
base to stage terrorist attacks against Israel. From this point in the early 1970s, until 
1978, the number of terrorist attacks directed against Israel gradually declined, as 
depicted in figure 5-2. 
41 For additional information on the War of Attrition, see also Herzog, The Arab-Israeli 
Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1982), pp. 209-
243. 
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1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
~Attacks 296 600 592 500 232 85 125 174 203 147 150 54 
•Fatalities 4 27 25 21 5 28 1 62 38 3 3 55 
Dlnjuries 9 258 171 118 45 112 15 211 178 74 128 265 
Figure 5-2, Terrorist Incidents Against Israeli Civilians, 1967-197842 
Source: Alon, 1980, p. 58 
Although the number of terrorist attacks directed at Israel declined, the terrorists' 
tactics evolved, becoming more violent while also including the allies of Israel. Israel 
met this increased level of violence with revised tactics of its own. First, it started to 
target the supporters of the terrorists as well as the terrorists themselves. Second, they 
42 The reason that I have only provided data through 1978 is that this represents the end 
of the classic period of Israeli military coercion against terrorism. In 1982, the Israelis 
conducted Operation Peace for Galilee, which was a conventional military invasion that 
is clearly beyond the scope of Alexander George's notion of"exemplary use of force". 
The remainder of the 1980s saw the rise of the Intifada, which used women, children, and 
young men to conduct what the Israelis considered to be terrorist attacks. However, this 
new wave of attacks was nothing like those that occurred up through the late 1970s. 
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aggressively carried out retaliatory raids against targets in Lebanon with a broad range of 
military force, including airstrikes, artillery, and commando raids (Schiff, pp. 17 6-177). 
Even with the revised tactics and raids into Lebanon, the Palestinians had a new safe 
haven from which to conduct their terrorist attacks, and the Israelis knew that something 
more drastic would have to be done in the future. 
4. Israeli Countermeasures: 1978 to 1982 
In response to the increase in ~errorist attacks originating from Lebanon, Israel 
sent a force of approximately 25,000 personnel into Lebanon in March of 1978. The 
primary goal of Operation Litani was to drive out the PLO forces that controlled the area 
and were using it as a staging area for terrorist attacks. They were successful in driving 
the PLO forces north and occupied the territory for approximately six months until a UN 
peacekeeping force replaced them. In addition, the Israelis set up a Christian militia force 
on their own, which occupied a buffer zone between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
(Alexander and Sinai, 1989, p. 20; and Crenshaw and Pimlott, p. 617). But even with the 
UN peacekeepers and the Christian militia, the two sides could not be kept apart. 
After repeated border violations and terrorist attacks by PLO terrorists, Israel felt 
compelled to conduct a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in Operation "Peace for Galilee" 
on June 6, 1982. Although the operation was supposedly in retaliation for increased 
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terrorist activity based out of Lebanon, there was also an ulterior motive for the 
operation: forcing the PLO out of Lebanon for good.43 
Although there had been a great deal of concern regarding the level of PLO 
resistance, the attack succeeded better than expected. Within two days the Israeli forces 
had taken their objectives, which were approximately 45 kilometers north of Israel. At 
this point the Israeli forces were supposed to stop. But as part of a pre-planned change, 
the Israeli leadership announced that the only way to bring about a final solution to the 
terrorist problem was to send their forces all the way to Beirut. 
The operation proved to be a tactical success. The Israeli military drove the PLO 
from Lebanon and controlled a great deal of the territory. However, from a strategic 
point of view, the operation was not as successful. Altho~gh the PLO had been driven 
from Lebanon, a large number of these forces were able to escape to Tunis and Syria, 
where they regrouped and fought another day. Even worse, the level of violence and 
collateral damage caused during the fighting created great hatred amongst the Shiite 
population in Lebanon. They would later turn this anger into guerrilla warfare and 
terrorist attacks directed at the occupying Israeli forces, which continue to this day. 
In order to maintain the sought after security this war was supposed to bring, the 
Israeli's were forced to station approximately 20,000 soldiers in Lebanon to serve as a 
43 For additional details concerning the background and reasoning behind Israel's 
decision to invade Lebanon, see Schiff, 1985, pp. 240-247; and Tessler, A History of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 
568-577. 
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buffer between the terrorists and Israeli civilians. Although this strategy worked, the 
soldiers serving as the security force quickly became the targets of the terrorist attacks. 
(Tessler, 1994, pp. 568-599, and Schiff, 1985, pp. 239-262). 
5. Evaluation of Israeli Countermeasures 
a) Positive Aspects 
One of the most significant attributes of Israeli strategy is that it 
demonstrated that military force could work as a coercive and deterrent countermeasure 
against terrorism. The Israeli retaliatory policy was responsible in some way or another 
for compelling a number of states to stop sponsoring terrorism as well as providing safe 
havens for terrorist groups. Military responses were also responsible for significantly 
reducing th,~ number of terrorist attacks directed against Israel per year. And finally, 
while part of a larger picture, the propensity of Israel to strike back has undoubtedly 
deterred some Arab States from sponsoring terrorism, while also pushing them to 
recognize and sign peace treaties with Israel. 
b) Negative Aspects 
While the retaliatory strikes of the Israeli military caused some countries 
to expel terrorist groups from their borders, the groups were never long without a home. 
No matter what the Israeli ·terrorist policy ever becomes, they will never be able to deny 
all possible safe havens to terrorist organizations. It only stands to reason that the willing 
sponsors and the terrorist organizations themselves should also evolve their tactics, as the 
Israeli countermeasures become more sophisticated. In this case, terrorist groups that 
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were considered amateurish at one time are now some of the most sophisticated in the 
world. 
Another negative aspect that came to be from the extreme measures the 
Israelis were willing to take in the battle against terrorism, is that they have caused a great 
deal of collateral damage to Arab lives and property. In doing so, Israeli military action 
has been, and continues to be, one of the best recruiting tools that terrorist organizations 
can use. 
6. Conclusion 
In this case study we have been exposed to Israeli efforts to deter Arab countries 
from sponsoring terrorism as well as their efforts to coerce Arab countries to cease their 
sponsorship of terrorism. We have witnessed how Israel has coerced states, such as 
Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, to stop sponsoring terrorism. However, Israel has not been 
very successful in deterring new states from sponsoring terrorism, or in keeping some of 
the states out of the terror business once they had been coerced into stopping. 
Nevertheless, this case is an example of the successful use of a coercive military strategy 
also acting as a general deterrent against would be state-sponsors of terrorism. 
In the first section, which covered from 1948-1967, Israel enjoyed some success 
in convincing states such as Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon to stop providing safe haven to 
terrorist groups. They were able to do this by conducting cross border retaliatory raids, 
which targeted the terrorist organizations as well as the sponsoring state. The states 
quickly figured out that the price they were incurring by suffering the wrath of Israeli 
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raids was much higher than any benefit they received from sponsoring terrorism. 
Unfortunately these terrorist groups soon found homes in other countries that were more 
than willing to harbor them. The pattern of terrorist attacks still continued from new 
locations. 
In the second section, which covered from 1967-1978, the Israeli policy was to 
retaliate against terrorist attacks by conducting airstrikes, commando attacks, and artillery 
fire. Once again they were successful in forcing some states to expel terrorist groups, but 
just like in the other section, these terrorist groups soon found a new home. This time 
their new safe haven was in Lebanon. 
In the final section, which covered 1978-1982, Israel responded with a large-scale 
conventional invasion of Lebanon, which was intended to drive the PLO out of Lebanon. 
Israel was successful on this account, but they failed to stop the PLO members from 
retreating and later escaping under the protection of the UN forces. Once again the 
Israelis were initially effective in eliminating a PLO stronghold, only to see them move to 
and operate out of Syria and Tunis. 
D. OPERATION INFINITE REACH 
In the final case we explore the U.S. cruise missile strikes against the territory of 
Osama Bin Ladin's sponsors. The operation, labeled Infinite Reach, consisted of 
approximately 80 Tomahawk cruise missiles, which struck training camps in Afghanistan 
and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, which the U.S. claimed was involved in the 
manufacturing of chemical weapons. These strikes were precipitated by the two nearly 
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simultaneous bombings of U.S. Embassies in ·Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania. 
The strikes were intended to be part of a continuing effort to defend U.S. citizens, 
property, and interests abroad against international terrorism. In a live briefing shortly 
after the strike, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated "·. . . we have taken these 
actions to reduce the ability of these terrorist organizations to train and equip their 
misguided followers or to acquire weapons of mass destruction for their use in campaigns 
of terror". He went on to say "we recognize that these strikes will not eliminate the 
problem, but our message is clear. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists, and no limit 
to our resolve to defend American citizens and our interests, our ideals of democracy and 
law against these cowardly attacks. Those who attack our people will find no. safe place, 
no refuge from the long arm of justice" (cited in von Fremd, Wood, Redeker, and 
Sawyer, 1998). 
You may ask who Osama bin Ladin is. Until the terrorist attacks in Africa, there 
were not very many people in the world who had ever heard of the man. In an effort to 
describe him, Raymond Tanter writes that Osama bin Ladin is " ... the prototype of a new 
breed of terrorist, a private entrepreneur who puts modem enterprise at the service of a 
world wide network. Because he lacks a government and is not a head of state, bin 
Laden's charisma has to carry the day. Indeed he is the type of charismatic leader who 
can attract a growing clientele of followers" (1999, p. 263). 
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1. Background 
Osama bin Ladin is one of approximately 50 children from a prominent Saudi 
family. He lived a relatively unremarkable and undocumented life until the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in 1979. It was this event that proved to be the turning point in his 
life when he traveled to Afghanistan in the early 1980s, and put his estimated fortune of 
approximately $300 million to work on the side of the mujahedin. While there he served 
as a logistician, recruiter, trainer, and eventually as a leader of one of the seven-
mujahedin factions (Shahar, 1998, p. 1 ). 
It was during this time in Afghanistan that Bin Ladin reportedly became a 
fundamentalist Muslim. He was able to use this religious calling to recruit thousands of 
soldiers who were willing to fight for the struggle of Islam against the evil of the Soviet 
Union. It was also during this time that Bin Ladin supposedly formed al-Qaida, the 
"base", which acted as the centerpiece for the Sunni Islamic extremists, and still serves as 
the center piece of his terror network. 
In what turned out to be one of the last conflicts of the Cold War, the United 
States assisted the mujahedin ·against the .invading Soviet Forces. The CIA provided 
these forces with sophisticated arms and training, and ended up playing a large role in the 
eventual defeat of the Soviet forces. Although excited by the victory, the U.S. soon 
realized that there were unintended consequences brought about by the end of the war. 
The departure of the U.S. advisors and the Soviet combat forces, left the mujahedin with 
a number of high tech U.S. and Soviet weapons, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, 
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tanks, and rocket launchers. The end of the war also sent a number of the "Afghan 
Veterans" back to their home countries with thoughts of toppling western-puppet regimes 
in favor of Islamic regimes. They were able to use their military training to set up 
guerrilla movements and terrorist organizations (Shahar, pp. 1-2). 
The story of Osama bin Ladin becomes unclear after the war in Afghanistan. 
Most of the stories state that Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero. He allegedly 
dabbled in. the family business, but did not forget about the "Afghan Veterans" who he 
still supported with his own personal wealth. According to Barry, Dickey, and Levine, 
Bin Ladin's followers were fighting for the Muslim cause against the infidels all around 
the world. They were constantly searching for a cause (1998). 
From the earliest days in Afghanistan Bin Ladin carried a personal hatred against 
the U.S., which he considered the next superpower infidel to be defeated in battle, along 
with the Saudi royal family, whom he saw as pawns of the U.S. The 1990 Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, and the subsequent deployment of approximately 500,000 U.S. servicemen to 
. Saudi Arabia apparently confirmed his disdain for the U.S., and likely was one of the 
defining reasons for sponsoring terrorist attacks against the U.S. Bin Ladin soon 
relocated to the Sudan and later to Afghanistan, all the while providing funds for the 
training, arming, and operations of his "Afghan Veterans". It was also sometime during 
this period that Bin Ladin allegedly began supporting terrorist attacks against the U.S. 
Today Bin Ladin speaks of the U.S. as the number one infidel country and the 
enemy of Islam. He seeks to " ... aid those who support his primary goal--driving US 
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forces from the Arabian Peninsula, removing the Saudi ruling family from power, and 
"liberating Palestine-or his secondary goals of removing Western military forces and 
overthrowing what he calls corrupt, Western-oriented governments in predominantly 
Muslim countries" (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999, p. 29). In May of 1998 Bin 
Ladin publicly issued a fatwa (a religious ruling) against the United States. The fatwa 
explains the primary reasons that a Jihad has been declared against Americans. First, the 
U.S. has been occupying the holiest places of Islam, plundering its riches, controlling the 
rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and using the bases in the Arabian 
Peninsula to fight neighboring Muslim people. Second are the devastating attacks and 
san~tions against the Iraqi people. Finally, the U.S. support for Israel justifies attacks on 
Americans (Karmen, 1998). 
2. Chronology of Osama's Terrorism 
The U.S. suspects Osama bin Ladin of being responsible for a number of terrorist 
attacks directed at U.S. citizens, property, or interests. He has alluded to the possibility 
that some of the terrorist incidents in question were supported by and carried out by his 
organization, but he will not openly take responsibility for the attacks in question.44 
However, he has publicly condoned these same terrorist incidents on a number of 
44 News correspondent John Miller conducted an interview with Osama bin Ladin 
approximately two months before the African Embassy bombings in August of 1998. In 
the interview bin Ladin denied having anything to do with the terrorist attacks that the 
U.S. has attributed to his organization. See Miller, "Greetings, America. My Name is 
Osama bin Ladin. Now that I have your Attention ... ", Esquire, February 1999, v 131, no 
2, p. 96. 
129 
occasions. The following chronology is an attempt to document the terrorist incidents 
















Osama bin Ladin-Sponsored Terror 
Description of Event 
Hotel bombing directed at U.S. service-members enroute to 
Somalia. 
Failed assassination attempt against Jordanian Crown 
Prince Abdullah. 
World Trade Center bombed. Six people killed and hundreds 
injured. 
Car bomb destroyed Saudi Arabian National Guard training 
base. Seven people were killed. 
Failed assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak. 
Truck bomb kills five U.S. servicemen. 
Egyptian Embassy bombed. Seventeen people are killed. 
Failed assassination attempt against the Pope. 
Truck bomb destroyed Khobar Towers. Nineteen U.S. 
servicemembers are killed. 
Two U.S. Embassies are bombed. Over 700 people were killed 
and almost 6,000 were wounded. 
Source: Tanter, 1999, pp. 264-266 
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3. U.S. Response to Bombing of the African Embassies 
On August 20, 1998, the U.S. conducted elaborately orchestrated attacks against 
suspected sponsors of terrorism. Approximately 80 cruise missiles were fired against two 
targets that were linked to Osama bin Ladin and his terrorist network. Besides serving as 
a retaliatory strike against terrorism, the strikes were apparently launched for two other 
reasons. First, U.S. officials had strong evidence that indicated the bin Laden terrorist 
network was planning further terrorist attacks. Second, the U.S. believed that the facility 
in Sudan had the capability to produce chemical weapons (Grier and Landay, 1998). 
The cruise missile strikes also signaled that the U.S. war against terrorism had 
taken a new and. tougher course. The strikes signaled a movement to a more aggressive 
U.S. counterterrorist policy in response to the new type of non-state sponsorship that Bin 
Ladin brings to terrorism. Newman, Whitelaw, Auster, Charski, and Cook observe that 
bin Ladin's terrorist organization is unlike most other terrorist groups in that it is not 
sponsored by any particular country, but instead appear to be financed totally by bin 
Ladin's own money (1998). 
4. Evaluation of Operation Infinite Reach 
In the evaluation of Operation Infinite Reach it is important to note that the U.S. 
conducted the strikes approximately two weeks after the bombings, a short time in the 
history of U.S. responses to terrorist attacks. The administration felt confident in their 
evaluation that bin Ladin was the primary person involved in the attacks, and they made a · 
decision to act quickly. The administration elected to counter these attacks with a limited 
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military operation that was intended to send signals to a number of different people and 
organizations. First, it was important that we demonstrated to the nations that were 
harboring Bin Ladin's organization, namely Afghanistan and Sudan, that we will not 
allow them to serve as safe havens for terrorists. Second, this operation was meant to 
serve as a deterrent threat aimed at active and potential future state sponsors of terrorism. 
Third, this operation was meant to serve as a coercive and or deterrent threat towards 
terrorist organizations themselves. A clear message has been broadcast to state sponsors 
of terrorism, as well as to terrorist organizations, that they are not safe from the long 
reach of the U.S. military. 
Within this framework there are a number of competing opinions as to the 
effectiveness of the operation. Because the operation occurred such a short time ago, the 
information available is far from complete. But there is enough information to assess 
some of the positive and negative aspects of the strikes. 
a) Positive Aspects 
The first and foremost positive aspect of this operation is that the missiles 
successfully destroyed the two intended targets, the training camps in Afghanistan and 
the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan. In doing so the U.S. demonstrated the resolve and 
commitment to act forcefully and expeditiously when its citizens and interests were 
threatened or attacked 
One other important aspect to consider is that the U.S. now asserts that it 
could take military action against government facilities in countries that provide safe 
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haven to terrorists. In an interview with the Associated Press, Richard Clarke, the 
President's coordinator for counterterrorism summarized the administration's strategy. 
He stated that" ... the U.S. could bomb government facilities or civilian infrastructure in 
countries that knowingly harbor terrorists".45 This is not a new strategy that the 
administration has decided to implement. " ... the Clinton administration has repeatedly 
warned countries that sponsor terrorism that they are not exempt from punitive measures. 
Now the U.S. is "upping the ante" .. A country that knowingly gives sanctuary to 
terrorists-even if not directly involved in planning or executing terrorist activity-could 
find itselflooking down the barrel of the American counter-terrorism apparatus".46 
b) Negative Aspects 
On the negative side, it is apparent that the 1998 cruise missile strikes 
have not been successful in stopping bin Ladin's activity. Livingstone and Prina write 
that from December 1998, to May 1999, " ... the United States has preempted at least 
seven vehicle bomb attacks on U.S. facilities overseas that are believed to have been 
orchestrated by bin Ladin and his disciples. In addition, a network of Muslim extremists 
linked to bin Ladin has been uncovered n the United States (1999). 
Another negative aspect for consideration is the publicity we are providing 
bin Ladin's cause. By demonizing bin Ladin and making him public enemy number one, 
45 "United States Raising the Stakes for Sponsoring Terrorism", Associated Press, 
February 10, 1999. 
46 Ibid. 
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we may be creating a cultural hero of legendary proportion for the disaffected Islamic 
world. The public persecution and hunt for bin Ladin is also threatening our relationship 
with our Arab coalition partners. In hindsight, we may have been better off taking a more 
discrete and less violent approach in this case, or we could have used force other than 
missiles or struck back more than once. 
5. Conclusion 
Osama bin Ladin's rise to the center stage of the terrorist world has introduced the 
world to what could be the future of terrorism, where non-state actors play a more 
prominent role in sponsoring terrorist activities. Bin Ladin's actions may have also 
prompted a new and more aggressive CT strategy, where the U.S. takes the lead in 
actively targeting the states that harbor and support these terrorists. 
E. SUMMARY 
The three cases studied in this chapter demonstrate that, up to this point in time, 
there are no policies or strategies that can make a state or individual completely stop 
supporting terrorism. However, each of these cases does show us that the behavior of a 
sponsor of terrorism can be modified in sonie way for a limited time. 
1. Operation El Dorado Canyon 
In this case Zimmerman pointed out that strategies that primarily rely upon 
sanctions or military force, would have a difficult time in changing the behavior of a 
state-sponsor of terrorism. He recommends a strategy that incorporates all of the 
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elements of coercive diplomacy, including the use of sanctions and military force, as an 
optimum strategy against a state-sponsor of terrorism. 
This case does not present a "tough test" of military coercion because Operation 
El Dorado Canyon was only a "one shot" operation. However this case does provide 
evidence that military coercion can modify the behavior of a state that sponsors terrorism, 
at least for a limited time. 
2. Israeli Responses to State-Sponsored Terrorism 
In the Israeli case we learn how difficult it is to rely solely upon military 
retaliation to deter a state-sponsor or a terrorist group from initiating terrorist attacks. In 
this instance there are too many possible attackers to be concerned with, and not enough 
resources to account for them all. Alon writes that " ... neither terrorism nor terrorists can 
be deterred. · There is, to our regret, no effective way to reduce the willingness or 
propensity of terrorists to strike". In an effort to minimize the effects, he feels that we 
should concentrate on minimizing the damage caused and on conducting counterforce 
operations that reduce the strike capabilities of the terrorists (1987, p. 130). In other 
words, I believe that he is saying that deterring terrorism is too hard and that there are too 
many possible enemies to deter, so Israel should concentrate on coercing the ones that do 
act into changing their behavior. 
In keeping with Alon's philosophy, in this case we were able to conclude that 
Israel enjoyed some success in coercing some states, such as Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, 
to stop providing safe haven to terrorist organizations by means of retaliatory military 
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strikes. For this reason, of the three cases presented in this thesis, this one presents the 
"toughest test" for military coercion because it featured protracted military coercion that 
successfully compelled states to cease their support of terrorism. 
3. Operation Infinite Reach 
Operation Infinite Reach once again demonstrated that one-shot military force 
alone is not the recipe for dealing with state-sponsored terrorism. The U.S. was able to 
inflict some damage on bin Ladin' s terrorist network through the cruise missile strikes, 
but it was not able to shut the network down. Once again, military coercion was used on 
a short duration, rather than a protracted basis. 
In closing I believe that this chapter demonstrates that relying upon deterrence 
against state-sponsored terrorism is a problematic choice at best. -By relying upon 
prevention of the act, deterrence is a prospective or defensive strategy that seems too hard 
to implement against terrorists' state sponsors. Coercion, on the other hand, seems well 
suited for use against state-sponsored terrorism. Once the identity of the sponsor has 
been uncovered, there are many response options available, ranging from full-scale 
military retaliation to the use of sanctions. I feel that a hybrid model of coercion that 
calls for more aggressive use of the military, the use of sanctions, packaged together with 
a strong determination to use them in a sustained way, and a new targeting strategy may 
be the best choice for attempts to modify the behavior of state-sponsors of terrorism. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Modifying the behavior of state-sponsors of terrorism through strategies of 
deterrence and or coercion is a reasonable goal for our leaders and policy makers. But in 
order to do so, we will have to modify our way of thinking about the use of these 
strategies. The first thing we have to do is identify what the leaders of the states that 
sponsor terrorism find most valuable. Once we have identified these things of value, we 
must be able to hold them at risk to insure good behavior. 
At the most basic level, the problem is one of costs versus benefits. We have to 
make the costs of state sponsorship of terrorism higher than the benefits that may be 
realized. The theories of deterrence and coercion fit perfectly into this line of thinking, 
because they focus on modifying the behavior of an opponent by manipulating costs and 
benefits. There is a limit to the cost a state is willing to pay for involvement in 
sponsoring terrorism. The price that each country is willing to pay varies, as does the 
point at which a particular country will cease its support. There have been instances 
where countries (namely the Israelis) have raised the costs to a high enough mark to 
modify the behavior of state-sponsors, and make some of them cease their support. 
However, we have not been able to impose the sustained high costs required to force a 
state out of the sponsorship business. 
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In an effort to raise the costs for sponsoring terrorism to an unacceptable level, the 
findings of this thesis suggest that a coercive strategy is better than a deterrent strategy. 
Coercion appears to be the answer because our primary concern is not preventing an 
attack, but in looking for ways to modify a state's behavior to make it stop supporting 
terrorism. I do not discount the utility of deterring attacks, but I believe this can be 
accomplished through a vigorous coercive strategy, which might ultimately serve to shore 
up general deterrence. 
B. A STRATEGY TO COUNTER STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 
In an effort to increase the price of sponsoring terrorism I propose a strategy that 
is reminiscent of Cimbala's idea of a "Coercive Military Strategy". The strategy consists 
of combining the principles of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and military coercion as 
well as the use of some conventional military action (Cimbala, 1998, p. 14). 
My recommended coercive strategy focuses on four elements. First, I believe that 
this strategy needs to take advantage of the full spectrum of military capabilities, not just 
conventional military capabilities. We need to consider lethal and non-lethal measures, 
as well as covert and overt operations. By adopting a full spectrum of military 
capabilities, we will be able to engage a wider variety of targets by having more varied 
means for doing so, while also decreasing the likelihood of causing collateral damage. In 
the three cases, studied in this thesis, the primary responses to state-sponsored terrorist 
attacks involved military force. In each instance the use of military force had at least 
some positive impact on modifying the behavior of state-sponsors. In the case of Israel, 
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the use of various types of military force caused some states to cease their sponsorship of 
terrorism. However, by primarily relying upon military force, all three cases had 
instances of collateral damage where civilians were killed. The Israeli case in Lebanon 
demonstrated how excessive Israeli collateral damage and violence turned the Shiite 
population against the Israelis. 
Second, I believe that sanctions should be integrated into coercive campaigns and 
used as a supporting element against state-sponsored terrorism. In instances where there 
may not be support for the use military force, or the use of military force may not be 
practical, sanctions may provide a way to signal our resolve and apply pressure upon the 
state and its leadership. Sanctions can also play a complementary role in conjunction 
with the use of military force. There may be unique inst~ces where sanctions can be 
used to target the instruments of power of the country and erode the hold on power of the 
leadership. For example, if the opposing country relies upon Western technology, we 
may be able to block replacement equipment that is destroyed by our military attacks. 
Sanctions may also play an important role when force cannot be used. As 
demonstrated in the case of Operation El Dorado Canyon, once the U.S. chose to abandon 
sanctions and rely upon military force, we had to wait for Qadaffi to support another 
terrorist attack before we could retaliate. In instances such as this, sanctions do not 
require the "smoking gun" of a terrorist attack in order to be used. Sanctions also provide 
a means for the international community to unite in a common cause. Although rarely 
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successful, multilateral sanctions have sometimes played key roles m convincing 
countries to modify their behavior (e.g., see the case of South Africa). 
Finally, there are two considerations that must be thought of before sanctions are 
applied. The first consideration has to deal with the possible collateral damage that 
sanctions may cause. We must be aware that our adversary may be able to use this 
damage as a means to rally support for himself and against the U.S. The second 
consideration has to do with the historical record of sanctions, which has not been a very 
successful one. That is why I recommend that sanctions be a supporting element of a 
coercive military strategy, part of a hybrid model. 
Third, we must have the will and determination to use whatever means is required 
to force state-sponsors to cease their support of terrorism. By this I mean that once we 
have identified the country that is supporting terrorist attacks, we must keep the pressure 
on this country, much like the Israelis, until they cease their support, or until we change 
our policy on state-sponsored terrorism. In the cases of Operations El Dorado Canyon 
and Infinite Reach, we chose to respond with limited military operations, or single 
strikes. As depicted in Figure 4-1, this option along with unilateral sanctions, will likely 
have little effect on the behavior of a state sponsor of terrorism. 
How do we go about raising the will and determination of our government and 
our population? A good place to start would be to emulate the Israelis as much as 
possible. Because of the small size of Israel and the proximity to its adversaries, the 
Israeli people are exposed to the effects of terrorism on a regular basis. For this reason, 
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the Israeli population generally supports its government's tough stance on terrorism, as 
the people have built tremendous resolve to survive as a country. 
Strategies that appear to have a good chance to be successful are denial, 
punishment, and decapitation strategies that go after the security forces or the leadership 
of the country. By challenging the regime's hold on power, we may be able to convince 
it that our desires are for them to cease'their sponsorship of terrorism rather than the 
overthrow of their government. However, by directly targeting the leadership's hold on 
power, we must be aware that adversary behavior may be erratic-far from the model of a 
rational actor. 
Finally, we must do a better job selecting targets once the decision has been made 
to take coercive action. In the two case studies involving the U.S., the majority of the 
targets selected were tied to the terrorist groups, and their infrastructure, and had little to 
do with the leadership of the state supporting the terrorist attacks. These leaders value 
most their hold on power, and must be personally targeted in some way in order to 
modify their behavior. It was not until the Israelis began to target the states that were 
sponsoring terrorism, more often than the terrorists, that they convinced states such as 
Jordan and Egypt to cease their sponsorship of terrorism. Although Israel did not target 
heads of state specifically, the targeting of their organs of state power did have some 
influence on their behavior. 
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In Figure 6-1, we see a two-by-two matrix that depicts some possible options 
available to our planners, as well as possible targets these options may be directed at in 
the battle against state-sponsored terrorism. 
1. The Full Spectrum of Military Capabilities 
a) Non-Lethal Options 
By non-lethal options I mean the use of non-lethal weapons as well as the 
use of non-lethal strategies to coerce a state-sponsor to change their behavior. These non-
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lethal options can be used against state-sponsors by themselves or in conjunction with 
lethal options. There are two primary advantages that non-lethal options provide. First, 
they give us the ability to inflict pain or punishment on our intended target while virtually 
leaving the other sectors of society untouched. As previously mentioned, most of the 
leaders of these countries are primarily concerned with their hold on power, and have 
little concern for the welfare of their people. For this reason lethal options, that cause 
collateral damage and civilian suffering, often have no effect on the leaders unless they 
are directed at them specifically. 
Second, non-lethal options can be used in either overt or covert operations. 
Having the ability to deny our actions through covert operations gives us the ability to 
target such things as a country's banking and finance systems, computer networks, as 
well as the leadership of the country. Having the ability to deny our actions allows our 
leaders to attempt operations that might not be tried if there was no backing from the 
national and or international community. Conversely, overt operations allow us to target 
openly such things as the leadership of the country, the military, and the economy. 
Conducting these operations overtly would demonstrate our resolve to the sponsoring 
state as well as to the national and international community. Finally, non-lethal options 
leave open the possibility to escalate the operations into the realm of lethal options later 
on. 
There are a broad range of non-lethal weapons and strategies available to 
the planners and combatants. What I have in mind are strategic non-lethal weapons as 
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well as non-lethal strategies such as Information Warfare (IW), and Psychological 
Operations (PSYOPS). 
The United State Department of Defense defines non-lethal weapons as 
"weapons systems that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to 
incapacitate personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to 
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment" ("A Joint Concept for 
Non-Lethal Weapons", 1998).47 
Nonlethal weapons give the leaders and planners a variety of options to 
choose from, but they do not replace the use of deadly force. Their primary use is against 
targets that are situated in populated areas, where the use of conventional weapons could 
cause collateral damage, which could harm civilians. Because most of these leaders value 
their hold on power more than anything else, it does not stand to reason that harming 
civilians will change the thought making process of a state-sponsor of terrorism. 
The specific types of nonlethal weapons I am talking about are strategic in 
nature, and consist of weapons such as the carbon filament bombs used during the 
Kosovo air war, or bombs that emit an electro magnetic pulse (EMP), capable of 
disabling command and control centers.48 
47 This article also discusses the two core capabilities and categories associated with non-
lethal weapons, which are counter-personnel and counter-materiel. 
48 For a more detailed description of the non-lethal weapons available see also Lewer and 
Schofield, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Fatal Attraction? (London: Zed Books, 1997), 
especially pp. 5-23; and Dando, A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of Non-Lethal 
Weapons (London: Brassey's, 1996), especially pp. 9-28. 
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Information Warfare (IW) consists of "actions taken to degrade or 
manipulate and adversary's information systems while actively defending one's own." 
Within the IW sphere there are two subsets. First, is Cybernetic Warfare (CYW), which 
involves operations to disrupt, deny, corrupt, or destroy information that is stored in 
computers and computer networks. Second, is Transnational Infrastructure Warfare 
(TIW), which seeks to attack a state or sub-state's key nodes of infrastructure, to include 
telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, water, government operations, 
emergency services, energy and power, and manufacturing. Most of these nodes of the 
infrastructure are dependent upon each other; so much that an· attack on a single node 
could have a significant impact on the entire system (Hughes, p. 14). 49 
Until recently, the U.S. did not openly discu~s the possibility of using IW 
in an offensive role. This changed when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Henry Shelton, publicly disclosed for the first time that the U.S. conducted a 
form of computer warfare against Yugoslavia as part of the NATO air war. In a Pentagon 
report General Shelton stated "You can assume that we in fact employed some of our 
systems, yes.· The systems were offensive .in nature". But when asked for specifics, 
49 See also Forno and Baklarz, The Art of Information Warfare (Universal Publishers, 
1999); Denning, Information Warfare and Security (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison 
Weley, 1999); Libicki, What is Information Warfare (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, 1995); and Sands and Issler, Special Operations Forces, Information 
Operations, and Airpower: Prescription for the Near 21st Century (Monterey, Ca.: Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1998), pp. 51-70. 
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General Shelton declined to answer. A defense official later commented that General 
Shelton was referring to a broad range of information operations (IO), which involved 
computer cyberattacks against Yugoslavian air defense networks (Bums, 1999, p. 1). 
In his book What is Information Warfare?, Martin Libicki, of the National 
Defense University, has attempted to break IW down into seven stand alone forms of 
warfare that revolve around information protection, information degradation, and 
information denial. The seven forms of warfare are; command-and-control warfare 
(strikes against the enemy head and neck), intelligence-based warfare (the design, denial, 
and protection of systems that seek dominant battlefield awareness), electronic warfare 
(warfare in the electromagnetic spectrum), psychological warfare (information to change 
opposing wills), hacker warfare (software-based attacks on computer systems), 
information blockade (a form of economic blockade), and cyberwar (a grab bag of far 
fetched scenarios) (Libicki, 1995, p. x). 
Finally, it must be noted that the use of IW gives us at least limited 
deniability in the eyes of the national and international community, while also providing 
us a means to send a message to our intended target audience. 
According to Joint Pub 3-53, Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are 
"operations planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to 
influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of 
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals" (1996, p. v). In the battle 
against state-sponsored terrorism, the primary target of the PSYOPS campaign will be the 
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leadership of the state-sponsor. If the leadership cannot be targeted directly, an indirect 
approach can be used as a tool to influence the behavior of a large target audience 
throughout the state that supports terrorism. PSYOPS can be used to demonstrate the 
vulnerability of the leadership; erode the popular support of the leadership; isolate the 
security forces, military, and terrorists; and turn the populace, or a select group against 
the government in an attempt to make change. 
b) · Lethal Options 
During the past thirty years, the U.S. has responded to state-sponsored 
terrorist attacks with military force infrequently. Instead, the U.S. has primarily relied 
upon sanctions and diplomacy. In the three-recorded instances where military force has 
been used, the U.S. has used airstrikes and cruise missiles to primarily target things that 
are of little value to the supporting state. In an effort to make our future operations more 
successful, I believe that we will have to give more consideration to the possibility of 
using lethal options against targets directly related to the sponsoring state and its 
le.adership, much like the Israelis. In order to do. this successfully; we will have to put 
more emphasis upon precision military strikes, as well as the use of Special Operations 
Forces (SOF). This is very similar to the Israeli example, where they first actively 
targeted the sponsors of the terrorists as well as the terrorists. And second, they used 
airstrikes, artillery fire, and commando raids as the cornerstone of their successful CT 
strategy in Lebanon. 
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In an effort to modify the behavior of state-sponsors, future coercive 
strategies will have to focus more on using precision military strikes to affect strategic 
targets that are of value to the regime. Because many of these targets are located near 
built-up areas, or in underground facilities, we will have to be concerned with the 
possibility of collateral damage, as well as whether or not we can affect the targets. The 
array of precision guided munitions (PGM) and warheads available continue to make this 
option a viable one. 
The types of missions available for military strikes are depicted in Figure 
6-1, and can vary from counterleadership targeting (CLT) and command and control 
warfare (C2W)50, to attacking the military or security forces of the state that sponsors 
terrorism. 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel have the unique training and 
capabilities to conduct sensitive missions, of relatively short duration, that require a 
human element on the ground to make a tough decision. There are certain situations 
where PGMs and non-lethal options cannot accomplish the mission. Possible sensitive 
missions could include the extradition or abduction of an individual, or the assassination 
of an individual.SI More conventional SOF missions include such things as collecting 
intelligence, targeting, and conducting surgical raids. 
so See also Taylor, 1999; and Libicki, 1995. 
51 Although Executive Order 11905 states that no employee of the U.S. government shall 
engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination, there are a number of 
arguments that call for a re-examination of this policy. See Herbert, 1992. 
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c) Covert Military Operations· 
Covert military operations are "operations which are planned and executed 
to conceal the identity of, or permit plausible denial by, the sponsor" (Adams, 1998, p. 
xviii). According to Medd and Goldstein, there are three characteristics of covert military 
operations that make them perfect for coercing a sate-sponsor of terrorism. First, the use 
of covert operations provides the coercing state the ability to deny actions taken against 
state-sponsors in the national and international community. Second, they give the 
coercing state the ability to send a private message or signal to the state-sponsor that does 
not put civilians at risk like overt actions do. And finally, covert operations would make 
it easier to carry .out operations that call for the elimination of key facilities or individuals 
involved with state-sponsored terrorism (1997, p. 307). 
One of the key elements of covert operations is that they give us different 
layers of deniability while also allowing us to send a personal message to the intended 
target. It should be noted however, that it may be difficult to confirm that the message 
was received by the intended target, and to gauge the effects of the message. 
d) Overt Military Operations 
Overt military operations are "operations conducted openly without 
concealment" (Adams, 1998, p. xxiii). Where covert military operations seek to hide the 
identity of the coercing state, the use of overt operations allows the coercing state to 
demonstrate their resolve to the world. 
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2. Sanctions 
The threat of increasing lethality in state-sponsored terrorist attacks, along with 
the possibility of proliferation and or' use of WMD during a state-sponsored terrorist 
attack, do not allow enough time to let sanctions run their course alone. With this in 
mind, I believe that sanctions can and should be a key supporting element in any coercive 
strategy against state-sponsored terrorism. The key element to remember is that, 
whatever type of sanction is selected, it must impact on the decision-makers in order to 
bring about the desired changes in the decision making of the targeted state. 52 
3. Will and Determination 
In what is perhaps the most important aspect of a strategy to counter state-
sponsored terrorism, I believe that we have to demonstrate the will and determination to 
battle these states until they forsake terrorism as a tool of their foreign policy. Instead of 
grouping all terrorist attacks under the heading of criminal activities, to be handled by the 
law enforcement approach, I propose that state-sponsored terrorist attacks be considered 
as acts of war, to be handled by the "armed conflict" approach.53 Caleb Carr writes that 
until we recognize terrorism as a form of warfare, we will not be able to formulate any 
52 See also Tucker, pp. 16-18, 85-93, for a view that discusses the utility of sanctions. 
For a dissenting point of view see Singleton and Griswold, Economic Casualties: How 
US. Foreign Policy Undermines Trade, Growth, and Liberty (Washington, D.C.: CATO 
Institute, 1999). Medd and Goldstein, "International Terrorism on the Eve of the New 
Millenium", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (1997), v 20, no 3, pp.303-305, discuss the 
use of diplomatic measures, economic measures, and international agreements as pieces 
of the sanction puzzle. 
150 
type of lasting and meaningful policy to deal with the problem once and for all. But once 
we do recognize it as warfare, he believes that we should tailor our plans with the military 
in mind, because the military is the only organization that has the ability to end this 
problem (Carr, 1996/1997, p. 1).54 
4. Targeting 
In the few instances where the U.S. has retaliated with military force against state-
sponsored terrorist attacks, high-pay-off targets of the state-sponsor were purposely 
avoided in most cases.55 Instead the U.S. targeted the facilities of the terrorist 
organizations, such as the case of Operation Infinite Reach and Osama Bin Ladin. But 
' this has all seemingly changed overnight with the announcement that the U.S. may now 
target government facilities of states that habitually shelter terrorist organizations and do 
not cooperate with the U.S. 
In an effort to make the most out of our attacks, whether lethal or non-lethal, I 
believe that we must do a better job of analyzing and selecting the targets. Retired Air 
53 For additional information on the approaches of law enforcement and law of armed 
conflict see Erickson, 1989, pp. 57-58. 
54 See also Peters, "Fighting Terrorism Can the US Do It?'', 1998; and Lesser, Hoffman, 
Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini. Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, Ca.: 
RAND, 1999), pp. 69-70. In this section Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini build upon 
Carr's idea that terrorism should be considered an act of war. They coined the phrase 
"war paradigm" to describe it. They write that the war paradigm " ... implies taking a 
strategic, campaign-oriented view of violence that makes no specific call for concessions 
from, or other demands upon, the opponent". 
55 One of the primary reasons for this choice was to avoid collateral damage, which is 
consistent with U.S. policy and its sensitivities to casualties. 
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Force Colonel John Warden has devised such a tool in his article entitled "The Enemy as 
a System". Although his model was designed with strategic bombing in mind, it can still 
be used in the fight against state-sponsored terrorism by supplementing the ideas of 
strategic bombing with the taxonomy of coercion listed in Figure 6-1. 
The key to Warden's analysis is that planners have to· think deductively, in a 
strategic frame of mind, and approach their problem from the standpoint of the "big 
picture". He explains that, in order to be successful, one must first concentrate on the 
enemy as an entirety (the system), than secondly on individual objectives (the sub-
systems), and finally on what must be done to the enemy to change his mind. When all 
of this analysis. is done, one can consider how such operations will bring about the 
desired affects on the enemy (Warden, 1995, p. 42). 
Warden begins his discussion by describing his model of the enemy as a system, 
which is depicted in Figure 6-2 as a simplified model and again in Figure 6-3 as a five-
ring model. These are his depictions of strategic entities or systems, whether they be a 
state, state-sponsor of terrorism, or Osama Bin Ladin's terrorist network, al-Qaida. He 
explains that each of these systems is in essence living organisms, which are composed of 
important sub-elements. The elements are not all equally important in the day to day 
activities or survival of the system. Subsequently, the most important element of the 
system is often situated in the center, the most difficult area to reach, and the other 
elements are situated in rank order, all serving as a protective layer. The elements of 
Warden's model are leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and 
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fighting mechanism. It must be noted that these elements can be modified for each 
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\Varden places the most emphasis on the person(s) that make up the leadership of 
the system. He writes, "a strategic entity - a state, a business organization, a terrorist 
organization - has ... at the center. .. a human being who gives direction and meaning. 
The ones who provide this direction are leaders, either of the whole country or some part 
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of it. They ... are at the strategic center, and in strategic warfare must be the figurative, 
and sometimes the literal, target of our every action" (Warden, 1995, p. 44). 
Because the leaders are considered .the center of gravity or decisive point of the 
organization, they are the ones that have to be targeted, either directly or indirectly. In 
order to carry out an operation against the leadership, we do not have to destroy or kill 
anything, although this is an option. The goal is to cut the leadership off from the rest of 
the system, because the sub-elements wgl not be able to function properly without it. If 
the leadership cannot be directly affected, or cut off from the rest of the system, another 
way to affect the leadership is to go after the sub-elements of the system lintil the 
leadership concedes or the system dies (Warden, 1995, pp. 44-45, 4~-50). 
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C. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned earlier in this study, the U.S. has four requirements that must be 
met by state-sponsors of terrorism before they are removed from the State Department's 
infamous list. The requirements are that they must "stop planning, stop financing, stop 
supporting acts, and stop providing safe haven and shelter for those who are involved in 
terrorist activities" (Sheehan, p. 1 ). Unless these requirements are met, or we change 
them, we have an obligation to uphold these requirements by using the elements of 
coercion that I have outlined in this chapter. 
But in taking up this fight against state-sponsored terrorism, we have to be aware 
that as the military asymmetry continues to increase between the U.S. and the remainder 
of the world, the threat of state-sponsored terrorist attacks against the U.S. will likely 
continue to grow. Along with the increased threat of attacks, we also have to consider the 
likelihood that the lethality of these attacks will continue to increase, as well as the 
likelihood that WMD devices will be used in these attacks sometime in the future. In the 
quest to counter and end the threat of state-sponsored terror, the evidence of this thesis 
suggests that a protracted coercive strategy, much like that of the Israelis, will likely be 
more successful than a strategy of deterrence, and may ultimately act as a kind of general 
deterrent, modifying the behavior of sponsoring states. The findings of this thesis run 
counter to the accepted theories of deterrence and coercion, which are supported by 
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authorities such as Alexander George, William Simons, and Robert Pape, that say 
deterrence is easier than coercion to make work. 56 
A protracted coercive military strategy also is more appealing because it may 
decrease collateral damage in the long run when compared to a strategy of coercive 
economic sanctions, whose effects are broadly felt by innocent civilians. Although a 
determined coercive strategy may be violent, it will very likely bring about the desired 
results much more quickly than the other strategies. Because the American people are 
averse to casualties and suffering; it stands to reason that a campaign quickly brought to 
closure through coercive military means may survive the test of the American people on 
be11er terms than strategies that prolong the pain and suffering on both sides. 
Finally, the wide variety of coercivt: options available to our leaders and planners 
'· 
allows a great deal of flexibility, and should be of great concern to the state sponsors of 
terrorism, who will not know where the attack may come from, when it will occur, how 
we will strike, or what we will strike. The only constant in this mix of options is that, 
once the coercive measures are applied, they will not be stopped until the state sponsor 
ceases its support of terrorism. 
56 For a discussion of the difficulty of coercion see Pape, 1992, pp. 426-429; as well as 
Pape, 1996, pp. 4-9. 
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